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SPORTS FACILITY FINANCING AND
DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES*
MARTIN J. GREENBERG"

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses six trends in the United States with respect to sports
facility development:
1. A Sure Thing is Never a Sure Thing. Lawsuits are now part of the
stadium game. Approval is no longer the final obstacle. Opponents
have found a new vehicle to attack facility construction even after
financing has been approved - lawsuits. Lawsuits have been filed in
many cities attacking the necessity of having a referendum, the ability
of the municipality to issue bonds, and whether financial assistance
can be provided to private parties. The challenges have been made on
every conceivable ground from constitutional issues to local ordinance
law.
2. State of the Art Facility - A Continual Redefinition. Every new
building that comes online is advertised as being more extravagant
and more profitable than its predecessor. Each new venue is cutting
edge. A state-of-the-art facility is fan-friendly and user-friendly, and
provides a sporting, entertainment, and shopping experience for the
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Managing member of Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC, specializing in the areas of real estate and
sports law. Professor Greenberg is also a managing member of ScheerGame Sports Development,
LLC, a sports facility development company. He currently serves as Chairman of the Wisconsin
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consumer.
3. Please Don't Go. The battle between the Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Commission and Major League Baseball and the Minnesota
Twins may have given new meaning to non-relocation agreements and
the typical landlord-tenant relationship. Non-relocation agreements
may be the most hotly negotiated subject in leases today.
4. The Boom in Sports Venues Has Shifted. With most of the major
league facilities either renovated or new, the secondary market and
college facilities seem to be the place where all the action is. As a
matter of fact, new or renovated college facilities have resulted in a
collegiate facilities arms race.
5. It Takes a Village to Build a Sports Facility. Sports facility
development is really real estate development. There is evidence in
both major and secondary cities that the creation of sports facilities
will either have a Master Plan or rippling effect of creating real estate
and economic development in the surrounds of the facility. A
Sports.Comm integrates the sports facility into a larger mixed-use
community.
6. New Economics. With the advent of enhanced seating, sports has
priced most of America out of the marketplace.
What follows is a discussion of these trends and issues.
I. "A SURE THING IS NEVER A SURE THING"
Obtaining approval for a sports facility financing plan is difficult at best.
Every community that has constructed or renovated a sports facility has
witnessed the acrimony. Debate rages amongst politicians, team owners,
economists, media, and the general public. Special interest groups join, or are
created, on both sides of the debate. Teams focus most of their efforts on
obtaining approval of the financing plan. The prevailing logic is that once the
financing plan is approved, the debate is over, and the facility will be built.
Approval is no longer the final obstacle, however. Opponents have found
a new vehicle to attack facility construction even after the financing has been
approved - lawsuits. Lawsuits have been filed in many cities. The necessity
of having a referendum, the ability to issue bonds, and financial assistance to
private parties are among the legal issues that have been addressed.
Challenges have been made on every conceivable ground from constitutional
issues to local ordinance law.
Lawsuits are nothing new to proposed stadiums and arenas. Court

2004]

FACILITY FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

95

challenges have occurred in many locations across the country. After Pinellas
County approved a financing agreement for a dome in St. Petersburg, Florida,
opponents challenged the plan on statutory and constitutional grounds.1 The
opponents claimed the agreement levied a tourist tax inappropriately and was
passed in private meetings contrary to the Florida Sunshine Law. 2 Opponents
also claimed the agreement required a referendum 3 and violated the equal
protection clause of the Florida Constitution. The Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the agreement on all four challenges.4 The Florida Sunshine Law was
not violated because the financing agreement complied with subsequent
statutes and amendments. 5 The Florida Constitution did not require a
6
referendum and no Equal Protection violation existed.
Opponents in Florida were not deterred by the Supreme Court of Florida's
decision. The stadium plan for Raymond James Stadium in Tampa, Florida
levied a surtax to pay for bonds necessary to finance the stadium. The plan
was approved by referendum. An area taxpayer challenged the financing for
the stadium on grounds that it violated the Florida Constitution. 7 The
contention was that the Florida Constitution would be violated 8 because the
county, city, and Tampa Stadium Authority (TSA) would incur debt, impose a
tax, and pledge public credit to aid a corporation. 9 The Supreme Court of
Florida held the stadium plan was valid because the stadium served a "public
10
purpose."
The Supreme Court of Washington used similar reasoning for a similar
challenge. 11 Opponents claimed the financing plan for a new baseball stadium
(Safeco Field) for the Seattle Mariners violated the Constitution of the State of
Washington. 12 The plan was challenged on four grounds:
1. The lease between the Mariners and the public facilities district was
13
an "unconstitutional gift of public monies to a private organization."'

1. Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Auth., 461 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1984).
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 286.011(1) (1983); Rowe, 461 So. 2d 7 at 74, 75.
3. FLA. CONST. Art. VII, § 12.
4. Rowe, 461 So. 2d 72.
5. Id. at 74-75.
6. Id. at 78.
7. Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 674 (Fla. 1997).
8. FLA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10(c).
9. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675.
10. Id. at 676
11. King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 949 P.2d 1260 (Wash. 1997).
12. WASH. CONST. Art. VIII §§ 5, 7.
13. King County, 949 P.2d at 1262.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

2. The taxes would not be constitutionally imposed and properly
collected. 14
3. Legislative authority was unconstitutionally delegated to the public
facilities district. 15
4. The plan required a special referendum because King County
would incur debt greater than 1.5% of the total land value. 16 '
As part of the appeal, King County sought declaratory judgment validating
the bonds. The court upheld the financing plan and validated the bonds.1 7 On
the first and third challenges, the court stated that the stadium construction
served a "valid public purpose" and an "incidental benefit to a private
organization" would not invalidate the plan. 18 The court held all provisions of
the Constitution of the State of Washington were complied with in regard to
the taxes imposed and collected. The court also decided the county could
finance the plan without a special referendum because the debt was within the
limit of 1.5% of the assessed property value. 19
Marylanders for Sports Sanity sued to force a referendum for the financing
plan for Oriole Park at Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland. 20 The
opponents argued that the Constitution of the State of Maryland required a
referendum for "any act of the General Assembly. ' 21 The Maryland Court of
Appeals held that opponents could not force a referendum because the
enactments that involved the Maryland Stadium Authority were "an
appropriation for maintaining State Government," which was exempted from
22
referenda.
The Libertarian Party challenged the Stadium Act 23 that created a stadium
district as part of the plan for Miller Park, a baseball stadium for the
Milwaukee Brewers. 24 The party claimed the Stadium Act violated the
Constitution of the State of Wisconsin on five grounds:
1. The act was a special or private tax law because it was imposed on

14. Id.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1263.
King County, 949 P.2d at 1266.
Id. at 1274.
Kelly v. Marylanders For Sports Sanity, Inc., 530 A.2d 245, 245 (Md. Ct. App. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 250
1995 Wis. ALS 56.
Libertarian Party v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996).
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25

2. The act permitted the contracting of state debt without a public
26
purpose.
3. The act violated the internal improvements clause, which forbade
the state from engaging in internal improvements (construction
benefiting private organizations) without a pledge of land by the
27
organization.
4. The act violated the municipal debt limitation, which required the
28
state to have enough revenue to repay the interest on a debt.
5. The act pledged state credit to a private organization
29
Brewers).

(the

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the Stadium Act against all five
challenges. 30 The tax did not violate the Constitution because it followed
specific criteria that were required to impose a limited tax. 3 1 As in all other
jurisdictions, the court held a stadium served a valid public purpose and was
not an internal improvement. 32 Because the plan contained enough revenue
from the imposition of a sales tax and the security in the stadium, the
municipal debt limitation was not violated. 33 Finally, the court held that an
allowable subsidy was given to the Brewers and not state credit. 34
As all of these examples show, municipalities and sports authorities have
won nearly every case filed against them. Lawsuits are still being filed,
however. Opponents now have a new tactic: file repeated lawsuits in an effort
to delay and increase costs, with the hope of canceling the construction.
This technique is best illustrated in San Diego. Opponents of the San
Diego Padres' new baseball stadium have filed sixteen lawsuits. Like other
lawsuits in this area, the stadium plan has been challenged on every possible
legal ground. Also like the other lawsuits, the opponents have lost. The City
of San Diego and the Padres are winning battles, but are losing the war.
Stadium construction was halted when temporary funds were depleted. The
25. WIS. CONST. Art. IV, §§ 31, 32.
26. WIS. CONST. Art. VIII, §§ 4, 7(2).
27. Id. § 10.
28. WIS. CONST. Art. XI, § 3(3).
29. WIS. CONST. Art. VIII, § 3.
30. LibertarianParty,546 N.W.2d at 424.
31. Id. at 431.
32. Id. at 433-35.
33. Id. at 436-38.
34. Id. at 438-40.
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project has been delayed for fifteen months. The San Diego Union-Tribune
referred to the lawsuits as "legal guerrilla warfare." 3 5 No one has formulated
an estimate of the total cost to the taxpayers of San Diego, but the
development of the entire East Village area was delayed. The Union-Tribune
' 36
stated that the delays "cost the taxpayers and the Padres millions of dollars.
The City of San Diego wanted to sell bonds as authorized in the stadium
legislation after the temporary financing was depleted. Because of the
uncertainty of the pending lawsuits, no financial company was willing to
underwrite the bonds. The City finally reached an agreement with Merrill
Lynch to sell bonds on February 15, 2002. 37 Bonds have been sold, but the
City will lose approximately $3 million per year because the bonds are being
sold with a qualified opinion. 38 The City and the Padres hope the matter is
resolved, but still fear further litigation. To discourage any new lawsuits, the
Padres sued a San Diego attorney responsible for sixteen lawsuits for
malicious prosecution, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 39 While
malicious prosecution is historically difficult to prove, in December of 2003
the court of appeals held that the attorney who brought the actionS was not
absolutely privileged to file the underlying actions. 40 The owners, however,
failed to make requisite showing of lack of probable cause in support of two
of three of the malicious prosecution claims, but evidence was sufficient in
one malicious prosecution claim to establish a prima facie case of improper
41
motive.
Opponents in other cities have observed the results in San Diego and have
followed suit. In Memphis, a trial court ruled the financing arrangement for
the construction of the new NBA arena was unconstitutional. 42 A group of
taxpayers led by the plaintiff, Duncan E. Ragsdale, claimed the financing plan
unconstitutionally 43 pledged state credit to a private organization. 44 The
Tennessee Court of Appeals overruled the trial court because revenue rather
35. On the Move Again; Ballpark Project Crosses Biggest Hurdle, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Feb. 18,
2002, at B6.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. DAVID Walters, What's a Clean Legal Bond Opinion Worth? $3 Million a Year, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Dec. 4, 2001.
39. Alex Roth, Padres hit Back, Sue Henderson in Ballpark Fight, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Jan. 9,
2002, at Al.
40. Padres, L.P. v. Henderson, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 588 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003).
41. Id. at605.
42. Ragsdale v. City of Memphis, 70 S.W.3d 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
43. TENN. CONST. Art. I1, § 29.
44. Ragsdale, 70 S.W.3d at 56.
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than credit was pledged and the arena fell within an exception for "public
purpose." 45 Despite their failure in the lawsuit, opponents succeeded in
delaying the project.
In Chicago, two groups, the Friends of the Parks and the Landmarks
Preservation Council of Illinois, had filed a lawsuit to stop the planned
renovation of Soldier Field.4 6 The groups claimed that the renovation project
"illegally uses public money for a private project and violates the Public Trust
Act, which limits the use of public lands to public purposes." 47 On February
21, 2003, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the lower court decision of
April 25, 2002, granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed
48
the action.
Sports facilities are not unique to major markets. Likewise, lawsuits are
not unique to major markets. The City of Everett, Washington is in the
process of building an arena for a minor league hockey team. Members of a
citizens group called Citizens for a Better Arena (CBA) filed a voter initiative,
which would require a referendum to relocate the arena. 4 9 While the City of
Everett contemplated the referendum, the Everett Public Facilities District
(District) made a pre-emptive strike by suing the city to prevent the
referendum for site relocation. 50 The District also sued CBA to prevent any
actions that could result in delays. 5 1 The City is literally caught in the middle
of the fight between the District and CBA. The District was created by the
City to administer the arena construction. Since they are both government
entities, taxpayers are paying both sides' legal costs. Everett has spent nearly
$13 million on arena construction. 52 Neither the District nor the City wants to
incur delays or cancel the project. The arena is viewed as vital to a downtown
revitalization plan. Any lawsuits will delay the revitalization and increase
53
costs the City cannot afford.
The delays in San Diego and Chicago have inspired, and will continue to
inspire, stadium opponents throughout the country. The stadium plans are so

45. Id.
46. Stadium Foes Seek Documents, CHI.
www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=4501.
47. Id.

BUS.,

Feb.

6,

2002,

available

at

48. Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161 (I11.
2003).
49. Everett Arena Dispute Lands in Court, HERALDNET, at http://www.heraldnet.com/
stories/02/3/1/15235857.CFM (Mar. 1, 2002).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. City Council Overturns Event Center Initiative, HERALDNET, at http://www.heraldnet.com/
Stories/02/3/7/15266481 .cfm (Mar. 7, 2002).
53. Id.
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complex, involve so many jurisdictions, and so many legal issues that issue
and claim preclusion are not applicable. Municipalities and sports authorities
have won, and will continue to win, the same litigation that has been decided
in other jurisdictions. For stadium opponents, winning is not necessary for
victory. Delays lead to increased costs for teams and municipalities. Thus far
teams have incurred financial loss, but every project has continued.
Opponents have been unable to cause enough delays to terminate a stadium
plan, yet. The court challenges are having an additional negative impact. The
cost of litigation and costs from delays are adding to stadium and arena costs.
Municipalities and stadium authorities will most likely seek declaratory
judgment before commencing with facility construction. This extra step will
only increase costs. Taxpayers will spend more money. The groups opposing
stadiums are thus costing citizens more money while not preventing
construction. Stadium opponents have created a situation where everyone
including teams, municipalities, and citizens lose.
Even after the stadium is built, public money spent, and the team occupies
its new home, there is no guaranty of "peace." The Cincinnati Bengals moved
into their new $458 million Paul Brown Stadium in 2000. The stadium was
built in part with money from a county sales tax hike. 54 Residents had been
angry that overruns greatly inflated the cost of the stadium and the Bengals
continued to lose after they moved in for the 2000 season. The Bengals have
not had a winning season since 1990 and have compiled the NFL's worst
record over the last thirteen years. Plaintiff Carrie Davis has alleged that "the
NFL violated federal anti-trust provisions by using its monopoly to extort new
stadiums at highly favorable lease terms from communities.... The bottom
line is the NFL lied not just to the Hamilton County residents but to numerous
communities across the country to make taxpayers fund a private enterprise."
Davis said, "They gave us wrong information to twist our arms into paying for
a stadium." 55 The lawsuit claims that the Bengals and the NFL have violated
the lease for the team's taxpayer-financed stadium with poor play since it
opened. The plaintiff claims that the quid pro quo for a publicly financed
stadium was fielding a competitive team. 56 The Bengals' lawyer, Robert
Stachler, has said to the judge in the case, "They're asking you to find as a
matter of law that the Bengals had some implied contractual obligation to win
a certain number of games." 5 7 The original plaintiff in the case, Hamilton

54. Joe Kay, Federaljudge upholds lawsuit challengingNFL, Assoc. PRESS, Feb. 9, 2004.
55. Id.
56. John Nolan, Bengals: TaxpayerLawsuit Without Merit, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 30, 2003.
57. John Nolan, NFL, Bengals Ask Dismissal of Lawsuit Over Stadium Lease, ASSOC. PRESS,
available at http://theintelligencer.net.

2004]

FACILITY FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

101

County Commissioner Todd Portune, has claimed that the Bengals failed to
field a competitive team and therefore should renegotiate its lease terms. The
lawsuit also names twenty-four other NFL franchises, accusing them of fraud,
civil conspiracy, anti-trust violations, and breach of contract. 58 Portune's
lawyer, Robert Furnier, has argued that the Bengals had claimed they needed a
new stadium that produced more revenue in order to remain competitive
among NFL teams in an era of player free agency, but the county had a right to
59
expect an economic return for providing the Bengals with a new stadium.
Furnier further claims that the NFL is liable in the lawsuit because it conspired
with its teams not to release financial information that would support the
demands of the Bengals and others for new publicly financed stadiums.60 The
lawsuit against the Bengals is aimed at recovering up to $200 million to offset
what some see as a lopsided stadium lease by reducing the taxpayers'
obligation for the $458 million project. 6 1 Hamilton County has now asked a
federal district court to join the lawsuit as a party plaintiff. Even those who
question the use of public funds for the public financing of sports venues have
questioned the integrity of the case. Andrew Zimbalist, a Smith College
62
economist, has said "It doesn't strike me... as a real strong case."
In November of 2003, Ulice Payne, Jr., Milwaukee Brewer team
president, left the team shortly after "he went public with his reservations
about further trimming the team's payroll by 25%."' 63 Payne's departure, and
further reducing an already reduced payroll, "brought the Club a chorus of
criticism for its failure to meet its promise of building a better ball club
through a new stadium." 64 The basis for the publicly financed stadium was a
promise of higher payrolls and a better record. Miller Park opened in 2001
and the Brewers' payroll has declined in the last two seasons and the Club has
not had a winning season since 1992.
After Payne's departure, several state lawmakers called for a full-fledged
public audit. Assembly Speaker John Guard and State Representative Bob
Ziegelbaur have asked the Brewers to allow an audit of the team by the non-

58. Nolan, supra note 56.
59. Id.
60. Kay, supra note 54.
61. Shawn Ley, New Developments in Lawsuit Against Bengals, at http://www.wcpo.com (Sept.
,11, 2003).
62. Nolan, supra note 57.
63. Arnie Stapleton, Restricted Audits on Brewers to Commence, ASSOC. PRESS, USA TODAY,
Jan. 31, 2004, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basebal/nl/brewers/2004-01-3 1-brewersaudit x.htm.
64. Id.
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partisan Legislative Audit Bureau. 65 The politicians claim that "wholesale
cuts in player payroll have raised legitimate concerns about whether the
Brewers ownership shares the taxpayers' commitment to quality Major League
66
Baseball in Milwaukee."
[W]hen the stadium was first proposed, 'the Brewers entered into a
bargain with the taxpaying public. In return for public support of the
stadium project, the Brewers promised to aggressively pursue
excellence. Recent events have significantly eroded public confidence
in the ability and even willingness of the team ownership to live up to
67
its part of the bargain.
"In another move, State Senate Majority Leader Mary Panzer... said she
had asked staffers at the Legislative Audit Bureau to review what tax
68
exemptions the Brewers have under state law."
Tommy Thompson, a strong supporter of the Miller Park financing
package and former Governor of the State of Wisconsin, stated that:
The Brewers made it clear that if we built a modem state-of-the-art
stadium it would provide them with the resources to field a winning
baseball team.... The taxpayers stepped up, built the stadium, and
kept Wisconsin a major league state-yet the Brewers have not
upgraded the quality of their team and now they are apparently cutting
their payroll further. The Brewers need to put an end to the games.
69
They need to invest in a winning team.
While the contractual agreements between the Brewers and the Stadium
District does not provide for public disclosure of financial information, the
Brewers have agreed to disclose their financial records in hope of restoring
public trust. The Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau and the Metropolitan
Milwaukee Association of Commerce will conduct separate reviews of the
Club's finances. 70 Rick Schlesinger, the Brewer's executive vice president in
charge of business operations, has said that this is unprecedented on several
levels. "I'm not aware of any professional sports team that's agreed to [the]
level of scrutiny ....

[T]he Legislative Audit Bureau usually audits state

65. Assoc. Press, Brewers Audit Requested, MANITOWOC HERALD TIMES REP., Nov. 20, 2003,
available at http://www.wisinfo.com/heraldtimes/news/archive/locaU/_13291118.shtml (last visited
Sept. 9, 2004).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Don Walker & Tom Haudricourt, Legislators Want to Audit Brewers, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 12, 2003, IA.
70. Stapleton, supra note 63.
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' 71
agencies. It's not in the habit of reviewing private enterprises. "
The audit to be undertaken by the Legislative Audit Bureau has several
restrictions including:

[(1)] expenses and revenues [will not] be itemized but instead lumped
into broad categories[; (2)] the local revenue category will include
money taken in from tickets, concessions, parking and suites but [will
not] list specific amounts from each[; (3)] specific salaries [will not]
be disclosed, although the report will show whether salaries are on par
with major league averages[; (4)] specific owner's ownership
percentages [will not] be disclosed, although their identities will be
reported[; and (5)] specific terms and conditions of partners or other
72
related parties' loans to the Brewers won't be disclosed.
To add fuel to the controversy surrounding public financing of sports
facilities, a study by researchers at the University of Dayton, released in
March of 2004, concluded that large public subsidies for the construction of
major league baseball stadiums are unnecessary. 73 Economic professors Mark
Poitras and Larry Hadley examined thirteen stadiums built between 1989 and
2001 and concluded that the teams could probably recover all or nearly all of
the cost of construction if the ballparks were built with private money instead
of taxpayers' money. 74 "The bottom line is that these new stadiums generate
sufficient revenues to pay for themselves," Hadley said. 75 If a stadium pays
for itself entirely, that should be sufficient motivation for the owners to build
it. While other economists are questioning some of the assumptions in the
report, the issue of publicly funded sports facilities will continue to be a hotly
debated topic.
II. "STATE-OF-THE-ART FACILITY - A CONTINUAL RE-DEFINITION"

Once upon a time, not all that long ago, sports arenas and stadiums were
expected only to be functional. Clean, safe, good view of the game and
reasonable lines at the concession stands. They were often ugly buildings,
surrounded by acres of pavement. You parked your car, cheered for your team
and went home. But over the last decade, that's all changed. Today, sports
venues must have glass-enclosed luxury suites, premier seating, retractable

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Marc Poitras & Larry Hadley, Do New Major League Ballparks Payfor Themselves?, at
http://www.sba.udayton.edu/research/working_papers/wp6.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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roofs, restaurants and microbreweries, and private clubs. You have structures
such as Los Angeles' new Staples Center, which is a $375 million
"entertainment experience.... The building itself has become the star of the
76

show."
A re-definition of "state-of-the-art facilities" will continue to evolve as
new facilities are built. Dennis Howard, a professor at the University of
Oregon's Warsaw Sports Marketing Center, has referred to it as, "it's sort of
become like a sports version of the arms race. Every new building that comes
on line is advertised as being more extravagant and more profitable....
77
[T]hese venues are expected to be cutting edge."
One thing is common to the definition of "state-of-the-art facility" - new
sports facilities are fan friendly, user friendly, and create not only a sporting
but entertainment experience for the consumer. Today's state-of-the-art
facilities do have some common characteristics.
Let's use as an example of the Great American Ballpark, the new home of
the Cincinnati Reds which opened in April 2003 at an approximate cost of
$346.22 million.
Stadium construction:
$291.0 million
Parking garage:

$15.18 million

Miscellaneous costs:

$10.18 million

Cinergy Field modification*:

$9.40 million

Crosley Plaza:

$8.35 million

Cinergy Field demolition:

$7.13 million

Site work and infrastructure:

$3.76 million

Crosley Plaza modification**:

$1.22 million

TOTAL:

$346.22

78

MILLION

1. A corporate name to identify with. The Great American Ballpark is
named after Great American Insurance Companies who will pay $75 million
79
over 30 years for having its name on the new ballpark.
2. One-sport-only facility. The Great American Ballpark will be a

76. Mark Emmons, New Arena Era Need for New Income Spurts Sport Team Owners to Seek
State-of-the-artFacilities,ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 22, 1999, at D12.
77. Id.
78. Cincinnati Reds Baseball, New Stadium Information, Coming Soon to CincinnatiRiverfront,
at http://www.cincinnatireds.com.
79. MARTIN GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 582 (2d ed. 2000).
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baseball only stadium, unlike Cinergy Field.80
3. A downtown or near downtown location. 81
4. References to the past throughout the ballpark and within its
architecture.
The exterior fagade of the ballpark will be brick with a cast stone base
and details. The major structure will be painted steel. The brick is
about baseball parks, their tradition, and a strong reference to the brick
architecture of Cincinnati. The cast stone provides a strong base and
references the images of the Roebling Suspension Bridge. The steel
structure is synonymous with the historic baseball parks and with the
brick facades evokes the romance of timeless ballpark imagery. The
main entry for most fans will be through a plaza at Second and Main.
Crosley Field Terrace inspired the design of the plaza. A familiar
baseball phrase will be posted along one of the buildings fronting
Second Street, perhaps "rounding third and heading for home," the
signature sign-off of Cincinnati broadcaster Joe Nuxhall. At the
intersection of Second and Main Streets will be the opening to Crosley
Field Terrace, a point most fans will pass through before entering the
ballpark. A statue of Crosley Field-era players will also dot the
landscape. Grass in the terrace will be sloped at the same incline as
the Crosley outfield. Special lighting will illuminate the player
statues, stone benches and a 60-foot stone sculpture meant to depict
the romance of the game. As you enter the ballpark, there are two
large mosaic panels. One will be an older era team with the Roebling
Bridge in the background; and the other will be the Big Red Machine
with Cinergy (Riverfront) Stadium in the background. Located on the
top of the main scoreboard will be replica of the Longines clock from
Crosley Field.82
5. The inclusion of a hall of fame, wall of fame, or museum of interest.
The Reds Hall of Fame will be one of the largest in baseball with room for a
variety of permanent and traveling exhibits, and encompassing approximately
21,000 square feet. The Hall of Fame will be a year round facility and may be
connected to the ballpark with an overhead bridge wall that will allow easy
83
ballpark access for tours and van access.
6. Huge concourses. At Great American Ball Park there is more

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Cincinnati Reds Baseball, supra note 78.
83. GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 582-83.
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concourse area with field views than at Jacobs, Coors or the ballpark at
Arlington. You can walk around the field level of the ballpark with views
from most concourse areas to the field, and in right field the concourse has
open views to the Ohio River. Most main concourses at the new ballpark will
84
be forty feet plus in width as compared to twenty feet at Cinergy.
7. Increased concession areas. Great American Ball Park will have an
increased number of concession areas and a wider variety of menu options.
Currently at Cinergy there is one concession window for every 300 fans. At
Great American that number will be one concession window for every 180
85
fans or an over 60% increase in the number of concession areas.
8. Increased number of restrooms. Another improvement to Great
American Ball Park will be the number and location of restrooms. For men
there will be approximately 30% more restroom fixtures than at Cinergy. For
women that percentage increases to 50%. In addition, there will be several
86
family restroom facilities located around the ballpark.
9. Increasedfan movement. At Great American Ball Park in order to help
move fans throughout the ballpark,- there will be many more escalators and
elevators than at Cinergy Field. Over nine public elevators will serve the
ballpark as compared to only one service-type attended elevator at Cinergy.
Escalators will be located at both the first and third base sides of the ballpark
87
and will accommodate many more fans than those at Cinergy.
10. Luxury seating. Great American Ball Park will have 61 suites and
approximately 300 premium seats at the field level behind home plate, which
will be about ten feet closer to the field than the closest seats at Cinergy Field.
Another 800 to 1,000 premium seats will be immediately above those seats,
which will be referred to as the "red seats." Great American Ballpark will
have over 83% of all seats on the baseline side of the field, unlike Cinergy,
88
which has over 30% of the seats in the outfield.
11. Theme restaurantover field. Great American Ball Park will have a
theme restaurant over left field with views of the playing field, the river, and
northern Kentucky. This kind of amenity will be used year round for not only
89
baseball but for wedding receptions and other events.
12. Modern technologically oriented scoreboard. The scoreboard area
will be significantly larger than at Cinergy and closer to the field. The video
84. Id. at 583.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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board will be a 20mm Saco Smartvision board, 30% larger than the scoreboard
at Cinergy. The board is state-of-the-art and is better than those currently
being used in new ballparks. The matrix (information) board will be larger
and will allow for continuous display of statistics and line scores. Several
other scoreboards will be installed throughout the ballpark and will allow for
all fans to have visual access to a scoreboard and pitcher information. An outof-town scoreboard will be installed in the left field wall and will allow 90for
other games to be viewed and displayed at the same time and continuously.
13. A stadium for all seasons. Great American Ball Park will not be
domed or contain a retractable roof. However, Miller Park, the new home of
the Milwaukee Brewers, will be a traditional ballpark reflecting local
architecture. The new stadium will have a retractable dome roof to protect
against the cool weather in Wisconsin during the spring and fall. The $50
million, 7-panel retractable. roof will open or close like a fan in about ten
91
minutes.
14. Facilities and 21st century technology. Twenty-first century media
technology in the form of broadcasting games in many foreign languages
providing HDTV and digital technology, the Internet and interactive
technology will have not only an impact on how sports facilities look, but how
92
they operate.
15. Amenities. The sports facility of tomorrow will continue to have and
create new amenities to make certain that the sports facility is fan and family
friendly, which will include clubs, restaurants, food courts, arcades,
playgrounds, swimming areas, novelty shops, and whatever the creative93mind
of tomorrow will determine makes fans more apt to come to the facility.
16. Revenue Generators. Now that the owners and facility districts have
determined that venues are the new Taj Mahal's packed with cash flow
potential, facility districts and the owners will continue to figure out how to
tap into lucrative revenue streams that increase the bottom line. Revenue
streams in the form of increased signage, sponsorship, parking and the like
94
will continue to fuel an unprecedented building boom in the sporting world.
Three new or recently renovated football stadiums have opened within the
last several years, including Lincoln Financial Field, Philadelphia; Lambeau
What follows are
Field, Green Bay; and Soldier Field, Chicago. 95
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Emmons, supra note 76, at D12.
95. 2003 FacilitiesSpecial Report, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., Dec. 29, 2003
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comparisons of the stadiums before and after renovation or construction.
What is certain is that a new state-of-the-art football facility includes more
enhanced seating, more points of sale, and more retail space, all for purposes
of producing more revenue.
LAMBEAU FIELD

96

POST-RENOVATION

PRE-RENOVATION

GENERAL SEATS

71,500

60,789

CLUB SEATS, INDOOR

3,000

1,920

CLUB SEATS,

3,200

0

SUITES

174

198

POINTS OF SALE

More than 340*

84

ADA WHEELCHAIR
POSITIONS

571

26

MAIN TEAM RETAIL

11,500 square feet

1,800 square feet

1.6 million square feet

650,000 square feet

OUTDOOR

STORE

TOTAL SPACE
(EXCLUDING THE
FIELD)

*Excluding portable stations
Note: The stadium's original 198 suites and 1,920 club seats were demolished and
replaced with new ones.
SOLDIER FIELD 97

NEW SOLDIER FIELD

SEATING

OLD SOLDIER FIELD

62,575

66,944

133 w/ability to expand to142

116

CAPACITY
LUXURY SUITES

96. Id. at 55.
97. Id. at 57.
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TOTAL PEOPLE IN
AVERAGE SUITE

20

16

CLUB SEATS

8,657

0

CLUB
ESCALATORS

4

0

TOTAL CLUB AREA

100,000 square feet

0

SUITE SQUARE
FOOTAGE

380

100

VIDEO REPLAY

2 (23 ft. x 82 ft.)

0

FIXED
CONCESSION
STANDS

67

12

PERMANENT
POINTS OF SALE

207

96

REST ROOMS

58

Not Available

PARKING SPACES

5,100

4,100

BOARDS (SIZE)

LINCOLN FINANCIAL FIELD

98

LINCOLN FINANCIAL

VETERANS STADIUM

COST

$512 million

$63 million

SEATING CAPACITY

68,532

65,352

DISTANCE: FRONT
ROW TO SIDELINES

60 feet

120 feet

PCT. OF SEATS
ALONG SIDELINES

66%

33%

LUXURY SUITES

172

89

LUXURY SUITE
SEATS

3,040

1,210

98. Id. at 54.

109
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CLUB SEATS

10,828

0

CLUB LOUNGES

2

0

ADA

WHEELCHAIR
POSITIONS

685

256

PARKING SPACES

22,000

16,000

POINTS OF SALE
(INCLUDING
PORTABLES)

308

84

NOVELTY
LOCATIONS

22

10

VIDEO SCREENS
(SIZE

3 (2 at 27 x 96 ft; 1 at 14
x 25 ft)

1 (31 x42 ft.)

MEN'S RESTROOM

1 fixture for every 58 seats

1 fixture for every 319 seats

FACILITIES

III. "PLEASE DON'T Go" 99
By the start of the 2003 season, 77% of Major League Baseball (MLB)
teams will have received new or substantially renovated facilities since 1986.
Baseball stadiums are a very costly public investment and are largely financed
through public subsidy. Financing these projects normally occurs through the
creation of a stadium or statutory authority and the issuance of bonds. These
bonds are supported through increased sales and use taxes, tourist
development taxes, sin taxes, car rental taxes, hotel and bed accommodation
taxes, ticket surcharges, and'contractually obligated income.
In order to fully reap the benefits of a new stadium, facility leasehold
agreements of today involve a contractual and financial partnership between
the facility owner and team. The team typically seeks to obtain management
control of the facility and as much contractually obligated income as possible.
In return, government officials require assurances that the team will remain
and play its games throughout the term of the lease. These assurances take the
form of no-relocation and liquidated damage leasehold clauses explicitly
recognizing that although the leasehold obligations of the parties can be
99. This section of the article is taken from Martin Greenberg & David Kleinmann, PleaseDon't
go: How the Twins Were Forced to Play the 2002 Season in the Metrodome, FOR THE RECORD, JulySept. 2002, at 5.
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measured and valued, the totality of the economic, financial, civic and social
benefits to the public from the presence the team playing its home games in
the city, cannot be precisely quantified. An analysis of those clauses and the
remedies associated with relocation are evidenced in the case of Metropolitan
Sports FacilitiesCommission vs. Minnesota Twins Partnership.00
1
On November 6, 2001, amid reports that MLB intended to eliminate the
Minnesota Twins (Twins) by buying and then folding the franchise
(contraction), the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission (Commission)
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking specific performance of the Use
Agreement between the Commission and the Twins and an injunction
preventing MLB from interfering with the Commission's contractual
relationship with the team. 10 1 On November 16, 2001, the Hennepin County
District Court granted the Commission a temporary injunction.' 0 2 On January
22, 2002, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld the Hennepin County
District Court's decision. 10 3 This was a victory for the Commission as it
ensured that the Minnesota Twins would play the 2002 season in the Hubert
04
H. Humphrey Metrodome (Metrodome). 1
The court of appeals found that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to temporarily enjoin the Twins from breaking their one-year Use
Agreement nor to enjoin MLB from interfering with the Commission's
contractual relationship with the Twins, because irreparable harm would result
if the Twins breached their promise to play their home games for the 2002
10 5
season at the Metrodome.
The court of appeals favored the Commission as the contractual
relationship between the Twins and the Commission was not a typical landlord
and tenant relationship. 10 6 The court gave several reasons why the harm
suffered by the Commission was an intangible loss to the community and not
merely lost concessions and advertising revenues: (1) the Twins paid no rent
for their eighty-one home games nor for year-round use of locker and office
space; (2) the stated purpose for building and operating the Metrodome was to
attract major league sports franchises to play at the Metrodome for the
enjoyment of fans; (3) the Metrodome was financed by legislation that
authorized the issuance of bonds and a collection of taxes; (4) the Metrodome

100. 638 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
101. Id. at 219-20.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 221

106. Id.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

was generally exempted from taxation as it was used for public, governmental
and municipal purposes; and (5) legislation was enacted to exempt the
10 7
Metrodome from property taxes.
IV. "A GREATER RELATIONSHIP"
A Broader Impact
The court of appeals' holding has a broader impact for baseball teams.
The court indicated that although a landlord/tenant relationship exists through
the use of a lease or use agreement, the relationship between the landlord and
tenant is much greater than that created by a commercial lease. The reasons
the nature of the relationship between a team and the governmental entity that
owns the facility is more than strictly a landlord/tenant relationship are as
follows:
1. A baseball franchise is a valuable and limited right that is
controlled entirely by MLB. The Supreme Court has ruled that MLB
is exempt from antitrust laws. The application of the antitrust
exemption to team relocation is ambiguous. However, MLB has been
able to prevent franchise relocation (the last relocation was in 1972)
where other sports leagues that are subject to antitrust laws have
10 8
failed.
2. The value of having a sports franchise is greater than simply the
rent paid or revenues produced and paid to the landlord. A baseball
franchise creates local identity, national press, media exposure,
entertainment value, community pride, business location decisions,
and economic and fiscal impacts.
A baseball franchise is a
community asset that is sometimes difficult to monetarily assess and
may provide to a community greater non-economic benefits than
economic. The value of the franchise is in its name, associated with
its city, and its obligation to retain its franchise in the community and
play baseball games at the facility. 10 9
3. Sports facilities are largely paid for with public dollars. Generally,
a government unit will issue tax-exempt or taxable bonds to pay for
the facility that is supported by some form of tax, whether it be a
property tax, sales tax, use tax, or sin tax. Because of the cost of the
107. Id..
108. See id. at 224.
109. Id. at 224-25.

2004]

FACILITY FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

113

facilities, the public exposure is often great in dollar value. "10
4. Despite most of the financing being provided by the public sector,
the team is normally given management control of the facility during
the season and normally retains not only operating responsibility, but
most of the revenues produced by the facility during the season. The
"keys are handed over" to the team, and the team retains management
control. Skeptics question whether the public receives an equivalent
economic benefit to justify the public dollar expense in creating the
facility. 11
5. The ownership of the facility is usually in a governmental unit, i.e.
a stadium district or authority. The district or authority is created to
not only construct the facility, but to retain ownership. Because of its
governmental status, financing is normally obtained through taxexempt bonds at government rates. In addition, because ownership is
in a governmental unit, no real estate taxes are paid on the facility. In
essence, then, by virtue of the creation of the facility, the team, i.e. the
2
tenant, obtains the benefits of government credit."1
Why? A GreaterRelationship
1. A baseball franchise is a very limited right with very limited territorial
restrictions, and there have essentially been few, if any, relocations.
Baseball's antitrust exemption allows MLB more control over its
franchises than other sports organizations. MLB is an exclusive "club."
Officially, MLB is an unincorporated association comprised of thirty
franchises. MLB has control over admission of new members to the "club";
i.e., expansion teams or any changes in "club membership"; i.e., relocation or
sales of teams.
In baseball's first sixty years, no new franchises were granted, and the
number of teams remained constant at sixteen. The 1960's can be best
characterized as the decade of expansion as eight teams were added. Since
1969, only six teams have been added. Although there are more franchises
than ever before, the total number remains small and most teams are situated
in major metropolitan markets.

110. See generally, id at 224
111. Id.
112. Id.
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The cost of acquiring an expansion team has risen dramatically since
1961. In addition to the franchise fee, team owners are required to outlay cash
for equipment, facilities, establishing a minor league system, scouts, coaches,
and front office personnel to name a few. Diamondbacks owner Jerry
Colangelo estimates that the total investment for the Diamondbacks exceeded
113
$350 million.
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL EXPANSION 1961-1998114

TEAM

Los Angeles Angels
Washington Senators
Houston Colt .45's
New York Mets
Kansas City Royals
Seattle Pilots
Seattle Mariners
Toronto Blue Jays
Colorado Rockies
Florida Marlins
Arizona Diamondbacks
Tampa Bay Devil Rays

YEAR

FEE PAID (MILLIONS)

1961
1961
1962
1962
1969
1969
1977
1977
1993
1993
1998
1998

$2.1
$2.1
$1.85
$1.8
$5.5
$5.55
$6.25
$7.00
$95
$95
$130
$130

Purchasing a team is also becoming increasingly more costly. The most
recent reported purchase prices of MLB teams are shown below:
1 15
RECENT SALES OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAMS

TEAM

YEAR PURCHASED

PURCHASE PRICE
(MILLIONS)

Boston Red Sox*'

2002

$700

Florida Marlins

2002
2002

$158
$391

2002

$120

New York Mets
Montreal Expos

113. Chuck Johnson, D'backs Face Cloudy Future, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2001, at Cl.
114. MARTIN GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 1110-11 (2d. ed. 1998).
115. National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School (NSLI), Sports Facility
Reports, Vol. 3, No. 1. (2002), at http://www.marquette.edu/law/sports/sfr/mlb.pdf.
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Kansas City Royals
Cleveland Indians
Toronto Blue Jays
Anaheim Angels

115

2000
2000
2000
2000

$96
$323
$140
$140

Cincinnati Reds

1999

$183

Los Angeles Dodgers
Texas Rangers

1998
1998

$311
$250

*Included 80% of NESN (Regional Sports Network)
The April 26, 2004 edition of Forbes magazine estimated the value of the
top fifteen baseball franchises as follows: 116
TEAM! OWNER (YEAR PURCHASED)

(millions)

VALUE

NEW YORK YANKEES /G.Steinbrenner ('73)
BOSTON RED SOX / J. Henry, T. Werner ('02)
NEW YORK METS /F. Wilpon ('02)
LOS ANGELES DODGERS /F.McCourt ('04)
SEATTLE MARINERS /H. Yamauchi ('92)
ATLANTA BRAVES /AOL Time Warner ('76)
SAN FRANCISCO GIANTS / P. Magowan, H. Burns ('92)
CHICAGO CUBS /Tribune Company ('81)
HOUSTON ASTROS / R. McLane ('92)
ST. LOUIS CARDINALS / Win. DeWitt, Jr. ('95)
TEXAS RANGERS / T. Hicks ('98)
BALTIMORE ORIOLES /P. Angelos ('93)
CLEVELAND INDIANS / L. Dolan ('00)
COLORADO ROCKIES / J. McMorris, C. Monfort ('92)
PHILADELPHIA PHILLIES /B. Giles, D. Montgomery ('81)

$832
$533
$442
$399
$396
$374
$368
$358
$320
$314
$306
$296
$292
$285
$281

Baseball franchises are given the right to operate a team in a specific
geographical territory.
Major League Rule 52(a)(1) grants MLB teams
"protected territorial rights to a specific geographic area, called a home
territory."1 7 "Home territory" is defined in Major League Rule 52 (b)(1)(D)
as " the boundary lines of an entire county or counties (or parish or Canadian
division or district)." 1 8 Major League Rule 52(a)(4) and (d)(1) prohibits other
teams from "playing home games within or fifteen miles from the boundary of

116. Nathan Vardi, The Richest Baseball Teams, FORBES MAG., Apr. 26, 2004, at 70
117. OFFICIAL RULES OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL § 52(a)(1).
118. Id.§ 52(b)(1)(D).

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

any major or minor league club."' 119 For example, the Baltimore Orioles
control both the Baltimore and Washington D.C. markets. Orioles' owner
Peter Angelos would require a large payment to release the Washington D.C.
market to another ownership group.
Unlike other professional sports organizations, MLB is exempt from
federal antitrust laws. 120 Because of the antitrust exemption, MLB has been
able to prevent team relocation where other leagues have failed.
Consequently, baseball teams have become the most difficult franchises to
obtain. As the chart below shows, no MLB team has moved since 1972 when
the Washington Senators moved to Arlington, Texas, and became the Texas
Rangers.

MLB, NBA, NFL, AND NHL FRANCHISE RELOCATIONS SINCE 1970121
TEAM
Pilots
Senators
Bullets
Scouts
Jazz

LEAGUE
MLB
MLB
NBA
NHL
NBA

YEAR
1970
1972
1973
1976
1979

FROM
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC
Baltimore, MD
Kansas City, MO
New Orleans, LA

Flames
Raiders
Rockies

NHL
NFL
NHL

1980
1982
1982

Atlanta, GA
Oakland, CA
Denver, CO

Colts
Clippers
Kings
Cardinal
s
North
Stars
Nordiqu

NFL
NBA
NBA
NFL

1984
1984
1985
1987

NHL

NEW NAME
Brewers
Rangers

Baltimore, MD
San Diego, CA
Kansas City, MO
St. Louis, MO

TO
Milwaukee, WI
Arlington, TX
Landover, MD
Denver, CO
Salt Lake
City,UT
Calgary, Alberta
Los Angeles, CA
East Rutherford,
NJ
Indianapolis, IN
Los Angeles, CA
Sacramento, CA
Phoenix, AZ

1993

Minneapolis, MN

Dallas, TX

Stars

NHL

1995

Quebec City

Denver, CO

Avalanche

Raiders
Rams
Browns
Jets

NFL
NFL
NFL
NHL

1995
1995
1996
1996

Oakland, CA
St. Louis, MO
Baltimore, MD
Phoenix, AZ

Ravens
Coyotes

Whalers
Oilers
Grizzlies
Hornets

NHL
NFL
NBA
NBA

1997
1998
2001
2002

Los Angeles, CA
Anaheim, CA
Cleveland, OH
Winnipeg.
Manitoba
Hartford, CT
Houston, TX
Vancouver, BC
Charlotte, NC

Rockies

NJ Devils

est

Raleigh, NC
Nashville, TN
Memphis, TN
New Orleans, LA

Hurricanes
Titans

119. Id. §§ 52(a)(4), 52(d)(1).
120. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922); Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 917 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
121. GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 412.
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Baseball's federal antitrust exemption has been established in three cases
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1922 in FederalBaseball Club
of Baltimore, the Supreme Court held that baseball was not subject to antitrust
laws because it was not interstate commerce. 122 In Toolson, the Court
reaffirmed the antitrust exemption because Congress undertook no legislation
to overturn the exemption for thirty-one years. 123 Finally, the Court upheld
124
the exemption in 1972 despite calling it an "aberration" in Floodv. Kuhn.
The "trilogy" of cases dealt directly with baseball's antitrust exemption as
it related to labor issues. The question of whether the exemption applies to
franchise relocation has not conclusively been answered. 125 When the State of
Wisconsin sued the Milwaukee Braves to prevent the team from moving to
Atlanta, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that although the relocation did
violate Wisconsin's antitrust laws, federal policy (MLB's antitrust exemption)
preempted Wisconsin law. 126 In Piazza v. Major League Baseball, Inc., 127 the
Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to grant
a motion for summary judgment and speculated that baseball's attempt to
prevent the San Francisco Giants from relocating could violate federal
28
antitrust laws. 1
Today, MLB does have a policy limiting a team's ability to move. The
team must obtain approval of 75% of the major league teams. 129 Although the
application of MLB's antitrust exemption to franchise relocation has never
conclusively been clarified, the exemption's existence may in and of itself
have prevented relocation. MLB can make a decision to prevent team
relocation. The team would then have to sue to challenge the exemption. In
other sports leagues, such as the National Football League and the National
Basketball Association, in cases such as Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v.
National Football Leaguel 30 and National Basketball Association v. SDC
Basketball Club, Inc.,13 1 courts have ruled league policies preventing
relocation are violations of antitrust law. 132 Some contend that MLB's
122. Fed.Baseball Club ofBait., 259 U.S. at 200.
123. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 917.
124. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
125. Jeffrey Gordon, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and Franchise Relocation: Can a Team
Move?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201, 1213-18 (Apr. 1999).
126. State v. Milwaukee Braves., Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
127. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Penn. 1993).
128. Id. at 429-31.
129. Gordon, supra note 125, at 1214.
130. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
131. 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. L. A. Mem'l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1381; SDC Basketball Club, Inc, 815 F.2d at 562.
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antitrust exemption has become a tool to prevent franchise relocation.
MLB teams are valuable territorial assets. MLB has exercised control
over expansion, relocation, and approval of team sales. MLB's antitrust
exemption allows more control than other professional sports leagues. The
difficulty in acquiring a team coupled with the value of the team to the
community has caused communities to invest substantial amounts of money
and effort to maintain or bring a team to their corhimunity.
2.

A local franchise is a very visible, intangible asset.

The economic benefit to a community from building and committing
public dollars to a sports facility has been debated extensively, but never
answered conclusively. Economists and facility opponents have challenged
the direct and indirect monetary benefits that teams have suggested benefit the
Consequently, facility
community by virtue of the team's presence.
proponents and team owners have not only trumpeted direct and indirect
economic benefits, but also the concept of "intangible benefits" or "psychic
income." "Psychic income" can best be defined as having the benefit and
prestige of a team in a community and a quality of life that its citizenry enjoys
by virtue of a team playing in its community. Having a MLB team makes the
community "Major League."
Sports teams are not the only ones who rely on intangible benefits. Many
courts have used this concept as a legal basis to uphold legislation for public
financing of sports facilities when challenged. In Lifteau v. Metropolitan
Sports Facilities Commission,133 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held, "The
acquisition or construction of a stadium to be used in part by one or more
professional sports teams constitutes a public purpose for which public
134
expenditures could be legally undertaken."
Legislation to finance facilities has been challenged in numerous
jurisdictions. In nearly all of those cases, the legislation has been upheld. One
of the first cases in which a court acknowledged "intangible benefits" was City
of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc. 135 The Jets played their
home games at Shea Stadium in New York. Because of scheduling conflicts
with the Mets, the Jets wanted to play two games in the Meadowlands in East
Rutherford, New Jersey.
The court ruled for the City of New York, largely because of the
"intangible benefits" the City experienced from the Jets playing in Shea
270 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1978).
134. Id. at 753-54.
135. 90 Misc. 2d 311 (S.C. N.Y. 1977).
133.
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Stadium. 136 The court further held that:
The City was not authorized to construct the stadium for the lease
money consideration. The City, as a corporate body, has not, will not,
or was it intended to make a profit from stadium rental. It is the City
as a community, "the people of the City" to quote the statute,. . . who
37
are here threatened with irreparable injury.'
The Court noted that intangible benefits to the community were
specifically defined in the legislation that created Shea Stadium.
[Construction of the stadium is] for the benefit of the people of the
city and for the improvement of their health, welfare, recreation and
prosperity, for the promotion of competitive sports for youth and the
prevention of juvenile delinquency, and for the improvement of trade
38
and commerce, and are hereby declared to be public purposes. 1
In 1983, in City of New York v. New York Yankees, 139 another New York
State trial court enjoined the New York Yankees from agreeing to play home
games in Denver, in violation of a lease term requiring the team to play all
home games in Yankee Stadium. 140 Finding that the threatened relocation of
games would cause irreparable injury to New York City, the court waxed
poetic when it wrote:
[M]uch more is at stake than merely the loss of direct and indirect
revenue to the City.
The Yankee pin stripes belong to New York like Central Park, like the
Statue of Liberty, like the Metropolitan Museum of Art, like the
Metropolitan Opera, like the Stock Exchange, like the lights of
Broadway, etc. Collectively they are "The Big Apple." Any loss
represents a diminution of the quality of life here; a blow to the City's
141
standing at the top, however narcissistic that perception may be.
The court of appeals in the Twins case rendered a nearly identical holding,
"with no rent being collected, the major benefit that the Commission receives
under the Use Agreement is the Twins' promise to play baseball at the

136. Id.
137. Id.at 315.
138. NEW YORK CITY,ADMIN. CODE, ch. 729, § 532-15.0 (1961).
139. 117 Misc. 2d 332 (S.C. N.Y. 1983).
140. Id.
141. Id.at 336-37.
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Metrodome."1 4 2
In Poe v. Hillsborough County, 143 a taxpayer sued to prevent the

construction of a new stadium in Tampa, Florida on the grounds that public
money was being used to benefit a private party. The Supreme Court of
Florida held that the stadium served a "paramount public purpose," and the
benefits to private parties were incidental. 144 "[T]he Buccaneers instill civic
pride and camaraderie into the community and... the Buccaneer games and
other stadium events also serve a commendable public purpose by enhancing
the community image on a nationwide basis and providing recreation,
entertainment, and cultural activities to its citizens." 14 5 In LibertarianParty of
Wisconsin v. State of Wisconsin, 146 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin made a
similar ruling when the financing for a new baseball stadium was challenged
147
when it stated the stadium constituted a "public purpose."'

In the Twins case, the court of appeals voiced its agreement with the
district court regarding the benefits to the community:
The court (1) cited the role of baseball as a tradition and as a national
pastime, the history of the Twins in Minnesota for some 40 years,
including two World Series championships, the role of Twins legends
who have bettered the community by their volunteer work with
children, and the availability of Twins games as affordable family
entertainment; (2) noted that private buildings had been condemned to
build the Metrodome; (3) found that the welfare, recreation, prestige,
prosperity, trade, and commerce of the people of the community are at
stake; and (4) ruled that the vital public trust outweighs any private
148
interest.
3. A sports franchise often receives subsidies from state and local taxpayers.
Sports facilities have become increasingly important components in the
public finance market, causing the public financing of sports facilities to
receive significant attention. Many state and local governments are using
subsidization and tax exemption to retain or lure sports franchises to their
communities. There has been an increase in the number of financing projects
142. Metro. Sports FacilitiesComm'n, 638 N.W.2d at 214.
143. 695 So. 2d at 679.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 678-79.
146. 546 N.W.2d 424.
147. Id.
148. Metro. Sports FacilitiesComm'n, 638 N.W.2d at 222-23.
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for stadiums and arenas as communities plan to build or renovate new state-ofthe-art facilities for professional franchises. It has been estimated that new
stadium and arena construction costs approximated $500 million in the 1960s,
149
During the 1990's
$1.5 billion in the 1970s, and $1.5 billion in the 1980s.
there have been seventy-seven major-league facility lease re-negotiations,
baseball, basketball,
renovations or new venues built for professional football,
0
and hockey at an approximate cost of $12 billion.15
Cities have also offered "sweetheart deals" to lure teams. Some of the
lease concessions offered by publicly owned sports facilities to professional
franchises include reduced and deferred lease payments, tax abatements,
condemnation of property, management control, as well as most of the income
from enhanced seating, parking, food and concession sales, and stadium
advertising. 15 1 Cities have also guaranteed minimum ticket sales to a
franchise, reimbursed teams for financial obligations to its former city incurred
by breaching the lease agreement, paid league relocation fees, and constructed
new practice facilities in order to attract or retain a professional sports
152
franchise.
The Rams moved from Anaheim, California, to St. Louis, Missouri, in
1995. To lure the Rams from Los Angeles, St. Louis provided a new $ 260
153
The City received a rental
million TWA Dome (now Edward Jones Dome).
of $ 250,000 per year, plus 25% of the stadium advertising, and was
154
The team receives
responsible for 50% of the stadium's operational costs.
75% of the naming rights for the Dome. In addition, St. Louis (1) reimbursed
the Rams for lost revenue in southern California; (2) sold $70 million in seat
licenses; (3) guaranteed a three-year sellout of sky boxes and luxury seats; (4)
guaranteed ticket sales of 85% of the Dome capacity for the next fifteen years;
(5) paid off $28 million in debt owed to the Rams' Anaheim, California
stadium; (6) paid a $29 million relocation fee to the National Football League
and a $10 million settlement with the League; and (7) built a $12.5 million
155
practice complex for the Rams.
In 2000, New Orleans Saints owner Tom Benson claimed that the team's

149. JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT,

PAY DIRT: THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM

SPORTS 136 (1999).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Jon Morgan, More Pro Teams Getting New, Rich Leases on Life, Baltimore Joins Trend in
Lucrative Stadium, BALT. SUN, Mar. 9, 1996, at CI.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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home stadium, the Superdome, was outdated. Benson claimed that for the
team to remain competitive, the Saints needed a new stadium, or he would be
forced to relocate. In 2001, the City of New Orleans reached a ten-year
agreement with the Saints for $186 million.156 The city also agreed to pay the
team a subsidy of $15 million per year to make up for lesser revenues
generated by the outdated Superdome. 157 Even with the city subsidy, the team
has the option of moving after the 2004 season if it pays the city a liquidated
158
damages amount.
A public-private partnership is now the cornerstone of sports facility
construction or renovation.
The franchise, the local government, and
community and business interests provide financing, capital, or contributions
for the construction or renovation of a new facility. The governmental unit
issues bonds supported by a specific revenue source such as: 159
General Sales and Use Taxes

Tourist Developmental Taxes

Restaurant Sales Taxes

Excise/Sin Tax

Car Rental Tax

Possessory Interest Taxes

Real Estate Taxes

Ticket Surcharges

Lottery & Gaming Revenues

Utility Taxes

Hotel/Bed/Accommodations Tax
Resort Taxes
While the public contribution for a new facility is generated through taxes,
team contributions normally include direct cash payments; loans (bank or
league); guarantees; contractually-obligated income; contributions from
concessionaires, management companies and other service providers;
business, charitable, and community contributions; personal seat licenses; and
private financing. What follows is a depiction of baseball stadiums built since
1982 and the cost and percentage of public dollars used to build the facilities.
RECENT

MLB BALLPARK OPENINGS AND PERCENTAGE OF PUBLIC
FINANCING1

60

156. Don Hammack, Saints Solution Goes On, SUN HERALD, May 23, 2004, available at
http://www.sunheraid.com/mld/thesunherald/8735220.htm.
157. Id.
158.
159.
160.
2004, at

Id.
GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 171.
Petco Park Hits A Dinger with Design, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., Apr. 26-May 2,
21.
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TEAM

STADIUM

TOTAL PROJECT
COST(MILLIONs)

YEAR
BUILT

%
PUBLICLY
FINANCED

Cardinals
Stadium
Petco Park

$346

2006

60.1

$474

2004

63.5

Citizens
Bank Park
Great
American
Ballpark
Miller Park

$460

2004

49.6

$352.6

2003

76.0

$423.3

2001

77.5

PNC Park

$277.2

2001

81.8

Comerica

$326.5

2000

38.3

$270.0

2000

68.1

SBC Park

$359.1

2000

3.0

Safeco Field

$600.7

1999

69.7

Arizona

Bank One

$407.0

1998

71.5

Diamondbacks

Ballpark

Atlanta Braves
Colorado
Rockies
Texas Rangers

Turner Field
Coors Field

$274.4
$264.4

1997
1995

0.0
78.1

Ballpark at

$241.5

1994

84.3

Jacobs Field

$221.3

1994

100.0

Oriole Park
at Camden
Yards

$313.9

1992

93.6

$5.612 BILLION

16

62.4%

St. Louis
Cardinals
San Diego
Padres
Philadelphia
Phillies
Cincinnati
Reds
Milwaukee
Brewers

Pittsburgh
Pirates

Detroit Tigers

Park

Houston Astros

Minute
Maid Field

San Francisco
Giants

Seattle
Mariners

Arlington

Cleveland
Indians
Baltimore
Orioles
TOTAL

Based on these and other examples, the public generally pays
approximately 80% of the cost for a new baseball facility and approximately
70% of the cost for a new football facility. The public contribution is
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substantial in either case. Since communities do not receive much direct
financial benefit from the large investment, the return may be largely nonmonetary; i.e., the team playing home games in the facility.
4. Despite large public financing, sport franchises retain most of the revenues
and generally control the stadium.
Like other tenants, MLB teams have a lease or use agreement for the
stadium in which their home games are played. Every sports facility lease
agreement contains use and exclusivity provisions. Usually the team is the
operator/manager of the stadium for baseball events and even, in some cases,
non-bseball events. As such, the team can negotiate and select the
concessionaire(s), stadium sponsors, and food and drink suppliers. While in
many of the current leases the team will retain most of the revenue generated
from ticket sales, concessions, advertising, signage, merchandise, enhanced
seating, parking, and naming rights, the teams are also responsible for
operating and maintenance costs and normally share in the payment for capital
improvements. Rent is usually very low in relationship to the capital
expenditures the municipality has undertaken in order to construct the facility.
Stadium proponents claim rental payments must be low to insure the taxexempt status of municipal bonds used to fund facility construction.
Municipal bonds are more attractive to investors because of their tax-exempt
status. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 established rules for selling taxexempt municipal bonds for sports facilities. 16 1 The IRS Code established a
"Private Use/Private Activities Test" that states no more than 10% of the
principal or interest can be used to secure any interest or payment used in a
non-governmental trade or derived from payments from a non-governmental
162
entity.
What follows are analyses of some of the newer baseball leases for
Comerica Park, PNC Park, Safeco Field, Minute Maid Field, and Miller Park.
These leases clearly indicate that the team retains most of the revenues. The
team, however, participates in maintenance and capital improvements.

161.

GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 159-60.

162. Id.
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COMERICA PARK, DETROIT TIGERS'
BUILT
LEASE DATE

COST

RENT

TERM
GATE

CONCESSIONS
ADVERTISING
NAMING RIGHTS
ENHANCED

63

4/2000

08/20/1998
$260,000,000
Tigers are calling this a "sub-lease" from the Detroit
owntown Development Authority (DDA); in
reality, the Team is more of a joint owner since it
will contribute $145,000,000 to the costs of
construction; Team gives 50,000 tickets away each
year to low-income kids; Team "tiffs" certain ad
valorem taxes attributable to its use of the stadium
into a maintenance fund and will also contribute
(after six years) $300,000 per year into capital
improvements
35 years with six 10-year extension options
Team gets 100% except for Public-sponsored nonMLB events
Team gets 100% except, again, for certain Publicsponsored non-MLB events
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%

SEATNG

For Team-sponsored MLB and non-MLB events,
Team gets 100% of everything; for Public-sponsored
civic, charitable, or cultural events, Public gets all
broadcast fees (if any), net revenues from gate, and a
percentage of parking and concessions agreed upon
NON-GAME EVENTS with the Team on a case-by-case basis
Team's responsibility; however, this may be largely
off-set by annual contributions of ad valorem taxes
attributable to Team's use of stadium that are "tiffed"
into an operational and maintenance fund; the DDA
MAINTENANCE
must approve disbursements from this fund
Shared responsibility; Public makes $250,000 yearly
contribution into major repair and replacement
funds; Team (after first six years) makes $300,000
yearly contribution into same fund; if capital
CAPITAL
improvements exceed amounts in this fund, both
IMPROVEMENTS
parties must agree on a way to pay for them

163. NSLI, supra note 115.

125
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Team gets 100%; but Team pays $20,000,000 to
[public in partial consideration for right to operate
land manage parking in complex

PARKING

64
PNC PARK, PITTSBURGH PIRATES1

BUILT

COST ESTIMATE

COST BREAKDOWN:

PUBLIC
CITY TAX
REVENUES

1999-2001
$209,000,000
(site
clearance
infrastructure borne by public)

and

off-site

$40,000,000 paid as follows: $40,000,000
aid as follows:
Cash Upfront: $8,500,000 Cash Upfront:
$8,500,000
Annual Payments: $2,900,000 for 29.5
years {financed by 5% ticket surcharge and
naming rights agreement with PNC}
Annual Payments: $2,900,000 for 29.5
years {financed by 5% ticket surcharge and
naming rights agreement with PNC}
$169,000,000 paid from a variety of
sources including RAD Countywide 1%
Sales Tax
5% Amusement Tax on gate; 31% Parking Tax; 1%
Player Payroll Tax; 2 mills Mercantile Tax on retail
sales; 6 mill Business Privilege Tax on Pirates,
contractors, services, etc.
$100,000 per year base rent; plus 5-10% of excess
gate (see below); plus 5% of excess concessions
(see below); plus 15% of selected non-MLB net

RENT

revenues

TERM

29.5 years

GATE

5% ticket surcharge) up to $44,500,000; 95% up to
$52,500,000; 90% thereafter

Team gets 100% (net of 5% Amusement Tax and

164. Id.
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Team gets 100% up to certain caps (42% aggregate
gross concession revenue) i.e., after paying
concessionaire; and/or $9.00 per capita adjusted
yearly by CPI) for all games and Team-sponsored
non-MLB events; Public gets concessions at up to
ten Local or State-sponsored non-MLB events per
year
Team gets 100% In-Stadium; 100% of outside

CONCESSIONS

ADVERTISING
NAMING RIGHTS
ENHANCED SEATING

NON-GAME EVENTS

MAINTENANCE

CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENTS

PARKING

marquee
Tearn gets 100% of $30,000,000 over 20 years
Team gets 100% of luxury suites, club seats, and
PSLs
At Team-sponsored non-MLB events, Team gets
85% of gate (net of 5% amusement Tax and 5%
ticket surcharge), public gets 15%, Team gets 100%
of concessions, advertising, broadcasting,
merchandising, rentals, additional revenues from
playoff games, etc. Public to get 100% of 5% ticket
surcharge but this will probably go to Capital
Reserve Fund; At Public-sponsored non-MLB
events (five per year reserved for Authority and five
for State) public gets net revenues from the gate and
concessions
Team pays 100% routine maintenance, utility costs,
nsurance
Capital Reserve Fund started with $3,000,000 from
public bonds, augmented by 5% ticket surcharge
proceeds to the extent they exceed $1,500,000 in
any year, up to $375,000 (adjusted yearly by CPI);
public pays for any other repairs or improvements
that exceed amounts in Capital Reserve Fund
Still in negotiations; Team wants net full year
revenues'from parcel on Federal & Canal; net game
ay revenues from new parking garage and various
surrounding lots

SAFECO FIELD, SEATTLE MARINERS

BUILT
LEASE DATE
COST

165. Id.

1997/1998
12/23/96
$498,000,000

16 5

127
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Base rent of $700,000 per year adjusted annually by
CPI; plus a "profit sharing" plan under which Public
eceives 10% "net income" less "cumulative net

RENT

loss" pursuant to a very detailed formula

TERM
GATE

22 years with three 5-year extension options
Team gets 100% net of 5% admissions tax and 5%
surcharge on "gross ticket revenues" (paid into
capital fund)

CONCESSIONS
ADVERTISING
NAMING RIGHTS
ENHANCED SEATING
NON-GAME EVENTS

Team
Team
Team
Team
Team

gets
gets
gets
gets
gets

100%
100%
100%
100%
100% for all non-MLB events (except for

limited number of events scheduled by Public with
revenue shared on case-by-case basis)

MAINTENANCE

Team's responsibility

CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENTS

Team's responsibility partially funded by 5% gross
ticket revenues surcharge and partially by Public
through excess revenues from admissions tax (if any
arise after mandated bond payments)

PARKING

Public agrees to provide parking garage (minimum
1,525 spaces) and surface lot (165 spaces); Team
operates and retains all parking revenues subject to
possible obligation to use parking revenues to make
parking bond payments (for costs of construction),
but only if 5% admissions tax proceeds prove
inadequate for this
166
MINUTE MAID FIELD, HOUSTON ASTROS

OPENING
MEMORANDUM OF

3/2000
11/05/1997

AGREEMENT DATE

COST

RENT

TERM

166. Id.

$230,000,000

$4,600,000 per year ($3,400,000 base rent plus
$1,200,000 royalty under licensing agreement) may
be paid from future dedicated revenue streams
(example, naming rights) yet to be specified; also
possible credits against future admissions taxes or
parking taxes
30 years with two 5-year extension options
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Team gets 100% (less possible future admissions
taxes, however, these could be credited against
GATE
Team's rent)
Team gets 100%
CONCESSIONS
Team gets 100%
ADVERTISING
Team gets 100%
NAMING RIGHTS
ENHANCED SEATING Team gets 100%
NON-GAME EVENTS Yet to be specified
Team's responsibility
MAINTENANCE
Team's responsibility; Team makes annual
contribution of $2,500,000 into "capital fund" for
this (but these payments could, like rent, could be
off-set by future admission tax and parking tax
CAPITAL
RMPROVEMENTS

revenues)

PARKING

Team gets 100%
67

MILLER PARK, MILWAUKEE BREWERS 1

CONSTRUCTION

10/1996

DATE

2001
12/31/96
LEASE DATE
COST
$322,000,000
RENT
Base rent to equal 10% of the public's annual bond
debt service, less any taxes paid by licensees of
skyboxes; lease schedule calculates this to be
$900,000 in each of the first ten years, and
$1,200,000 in each of the second ten years
30 years with five 2-year extension options
TERM
GATE
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
CONCESSIONS
ADVERTISING
Team gets 100%
Team gets 100%
NAMING RIGHTS
ENHANCED SEATING Team gets 100%
NON-GAME EVENTS Team schedules all non-MLB events, subject to
public's approval, and retains non-game event
revenues
OPENING

167. Id.
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Team's responsibility, but the public makes yearly
contribution to the team of the lesser of 64% of
'annual actual maintenance costs" or $3,850,000,
and the team is allowed to include its base rent and
its $300,000 annual contribution for capital
improvements in "annual actual maintenance costs";
net result of all this could be total public
responsibility for maintenance in many of the years
dluring the term of the lease

CAPITAL

IMPROVEMENTS

Public puts $700,000 per year and team puts
$300,000 per year into "segregated reserve fund"
for capital improvements; beyond this, the public is
responsible for all major repairs and improvements

ARKING

Lease is silent on specific parking provisions, but it
seems that team would retain all revenues from any
lots or garages on the Ballpark site.

Under the current lease terms, the Twins pay no rent. The Twins are
required to share only 35% of concessions revenue and 25% of advertising
revenue with the Commission. It is estimated that the Commission will
receive only $500,000 in total revenue in 2002. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals clearly relied on the Twins paying no rent and sharing minimal
revenue with the Commission as evidence that the relationship exceeded that
of landlord and tenant. Because the Commission received relatively little
revenue, the Court held that "the major benefit that the Commission receives
under the Use Agreement is the Twins' promise to play baseball at the
68
Metrodome." 1
5. Ownership of the facility is usually in a district, allowing for no real estate
tax payments and financing through tax-exempt bonds at governmental
rates.
Most legislation for the construction and financing of a sports facility
creates a new governmental entity specifically to administer and own the
facility. The entity is usually called a stadium "district" or "authority"
(referred to as "District" in this section). Because the District is smaller in size
than the municipal or county government and its sole focus is the facility, the
District can be more responsive and efficient. Teams also benefit from the
Districts. The District will often sell the bonds to fund the facility

168. Metro. Sports FacilitiesComm'n, 638 N.W.2d at 219.
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construction. Because the District is a governmental entity, the bonds are
normally tax-exempt. Normally the District and the team do not have to pay
real estate taxes because ownership of the facility is in a governmental unit.
The recent explosion in the construction of new sports facilities has
focused increased attention on municipal bonds as a means to finance the
projects. Municipal bonds are debt obligations issued by states, cities,
counties, and other governmental entities to raise money to build projects for
the public good, such as sports facilities. Not all municipal bonds are taxexempt from both federal and state taxes. There is an entirely separate market
of municipal issues that are taxable at the federal level, but still offer a state,
and often local, tax exemption on interest paid to residents of the state of
issuance.
The tax-exempt status of municipal bonds used to finance the construction
of sports facilities is attractive.
The bonds often have the pledge of
government credit and require the payment of a lower rate of interest.
A survey of recent tax-exempt municipal bond financings of sports
stadiums illustrated how government units accomplished their goals within the
bounds of the tax law. For example, the City of Baltimore and the State of
Maryland issued $86 million worth of tax-exempt bonds to finance their new
football stadium and will pay the debt service on these bonds entirely with
non-stadium revenue generated from a state lottery fund dedicated to sports.
The debt service for Baltimore's baseball stadium is also paid through a sports
lottery. Similarly, the debt service for Coors Field in Denver and Jacobs Field
in Cleveland is funded through a six-county general sales tax increase of onetenth of 1% and a half-cent "sin tax" increase on tobacco and liquor,
respectively. Generally, the sources of debt service funding are designed to
shift the tax payment to nonresidents of the city where the stadium is being
built.
Most MLB teams are located in large markets. Newer stadiums are often
built in the downtown area or other prime or redevelopment areas of the city.
If those stadiums would be on the property tax rolls, the tax liabilities would
be sizeable. However, government entities own sports facilities, and therefore
no real'estate taxes are being paid.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals noted the tax status of the Metrodome in
its holding in Metropolitan Sports FacilitiesCommission v. Minnesota Twins,
by noting that "it [The Metrodome] was generally exempted from taxation.
The court has upheld legislation that was later enacted exempting the
169
Metrodome from property taxation."

169. Id.at 224.
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70

TEAM

STADIUM

YEAR

FACILITY FINANCING

Arizona
Diamondbacks

Bank One Ballpark

1998

The Maricopa County Stadium
District provided $238M for the
construction through a .25%
increase in the county sales tax.
In addition, the Stadium District
issued $15M in bonds that will
be paid off with stadium
generated revenue. The
remainder was paid through
private financing, including a
naming rights deal worth $66M

Cleveland Indians

Jacobs Field

1994

Detroit Tigers

Comerica Park

2000

Houston Astros

Enron Field n/k/a
Minutes Maid Park

2000

over thirty years ago.

170. GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 186-87.

Built as part of a city sports
complex that was funded both
publicly and privately. The
Gateway Economic
Development Corp. issued
$117M in bonds backed by voter
approved county-wide sin taxes
on alcohol ($3/gal on liquor and
$0.16/gal on beer) and cigarettes
(4.5 cents/pack) for fifteen
years. They also issued $31M in
stadium revenue bonds. $20M
was from early seat sales.
The Tigers contributed $145M,
with the remaining $1 15M being
publicly financed through a 2%
rental car tax, a 1% hotel tax,
and casino revenue. Comerica
Bank paid $66M over thirty
years for naming rights.
Financed through a team
payment valued at $53M;
Private investors contributed
$35M and $180M of public
financing came from a 2% hotel
tax and a 5% rental car tax.
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Milwaukee Brewers

Miller Park

2001

Brewers are contributing $90M
for the stadium structure. State
of Wisconsin is contributing
$160M through a five county,
one-tenth of a cent sales tax
increase. The $72M
infrastructure costs are split as
follows: $18M each from the
city and county, with $36M
from the state. Miller Brewing
paid $41M for 20 years for the
naming rights.

Minnesota Twins

Metrodome

1982

Pittsburgh Pirates

PNC Park

2001

Seattle Mariners

Safeco Field

1999

Financed through the sale of
$55M in revenue bonds, a hotel
and liquor tax that raised $15.8
million, and a Metro liquor tax
that raised S8M. The City of
Minneapolis spent $4M on the
infrastructure costs. The
remaining costs were financed
with $13M in interest earned on
the bonds and $7M from the
Vikings and Twins for auxiliary
facilities.
The Pirates contributed $40M to
the projects. The remaining
amount will come from the
state, county, and city as part of
an $809M sports
facilities/convention center
financing proposal that includes
a new stadium for the Steelers.
The Mariners contributed
$145M including $ 1OOM in cost
overruns. The public's share is
capped at $ 372M. Washington
State contribution: .017% sales
tax credit, proceeds from the
sale of sports lottery scratch
games ($3 million a year
guaranteed), and proceeds from
the sale of commemorative
ballpark license plates. King
County: .5%sales tax on food
and beverages in King County
restaurants, taverns and bars; 2%
sales tax on rental car rates in
King County, 5% admission tax
on events at the new ballpark.
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Cincinnati Reds

Great American
Ball Park

2004

Philadelphia
Phillies

Citizens Bank Park

2004

San Diego Padres

Petco Stadium

2004

[Vol. 15:1

82% Public. The $290M project
originally called for the Reds to
contribute $30M up front toward
construction, $1OM at
groundbreaking and $1OM when
the venue is completed. Rent
will amount of $2.5M annually
for nine years, and then one
dollar per year for the remaining
21 years of the 30-year lease.
However, because of the rising
costs of this project the team has
agreed to expand its lease in the
facility to 35 years. The county
will pay most of the cost using
proceeds from the half-cent
sales tax increase voters
approved in 1996.
$172M from Phillies plus cost
overruns; $85M from the State
of Pennsylvania; $89M from the
City of Philadelphia; $2M loan
from the Delaware River Port
Authority; $112M in site work
with cost shared by the City and
the Phillies.

$206M from the City of San
Diego financed through tax free
municipal bonds and funded by
hotel tax revenue; $74M from
Center City Development
Corporation (City Downtown
Redevelopment Agency) funded
by additional property tax
revenue; $21M from San Diego
Unified Port District; $173M
from the Padres.

Non-Relocation Clauses
To prevent premature relocation, the modern trend in sports facility leases
is for the insertion of specific language to eliminate or hinder a team's ability
to move. Sports venue leases currently employ "no-relocation/no-move"
clauses to protect lessors, communities and fans. Normally, a non-relocation
clause prevents movement for the term of the lease. The lessor reserves the
remedy of injunctive relief or specific performance in the case of a breach by a
lessee. Often leases contain specific language that stadium construction was
undertaken as consideration for the team playing in the stadium for the lease
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term.
The lease by and between the Maryland Stadium Authority (MSA) and the
Orioles, Inc. (the "Orioles") was one of the first leases to contain a "no
relocation-no move" clause. Since the Orioles' lease, non-relocation clauses
appear in almost all of the newest baseball leases. Each new lease attempts to
improve the language of the prior leases. As such, "no relocation-no move"
clauses have become more detailed and are sometimes separate agreements.
Another option available to municipalities seeking to prevent relocation is
a liquidated damage clause, which can be separate from or combined with a
"no-relocation-no move" clause. Liquidated damage clauses specify the
amount a team will owe to the municipality if the team relocates or cuts short
its lease during the lease agreement. Normally, the amount is commensurate
with the cost of the stadium construction and decreases yearly as the stadium
ages.
Baltimore Orioles
The Orioles began playing in Oriole Park at Camden Yards in 1992. The
lease agreement between the MSA and the Orioles contains Article XX "No
Relocation." Article XX states that the Orioles will not relocate during the
term of the lease agreement as "consideration" for the construction of the
ballpark. 17 1 The Orioles are forbidden from relocating the team or playing
post-season games in any other location. 172 The sale, assignment, or transfer
of the team is not permitted unless all of the obligations of the lease are
assumed, including the relocation prohibitions. 173 The MSA can use any
174
remedy available at law or equity, including specific performance.
ColoradoRockies
The Rockies began playing in Coors Field in 1995. The lease agreement
between the Stadium District ("District") and The Rockies contains Article
XIII "Relocation of Team." Article XIII states that the District will be
"irreparably harmed" by the relocation of the team, and the District does not

171. AGREEMENT REGARDING ORIOLE PARK AT CAMDEN YARDS BETWEEN THE MARYLAND

STADIUMA UTHORITY AND THE ORIoLEs, INC., SEPTEMBER 2, 1992, Art. XX, at 139 (1992).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

have "an adequate remedy at law for breach."' 75 The Rockies are prohibited
from applying to the National League for approval for the team to play
anywhere besides Coors Field.' 76 The Rockies acknowledge that the stadium
was constructed, the sales tax was imposed, and bonds were issued "solely" to
bring the Rockies to the District. 177 The team agrees that the District can
obtain an injunction without posting a bond to prevent the Rockies from
relocating.' 78 The District is also entitled to pursue the remedy of specific
79
performance. 1
Houston Astros
The Astros began playing in Minute Maid (then Enron)'Park in 2000. The
Astros signed a Non-Relocation Agreement with the Harris County-Houston
Sports Authority ("Authority"). The agreement contains a "Covenant to Play"
in the stadium. Relocation, attempted relocation, failure to play in the
stadium, obtaining or attempting to obtain Major League Baseball's permission
to relocate, third-party relocation negotiations, and bankruptcy are prohibited
by this agreement. 180 The agreement gives the Authority four remedies:
1. Injunctive or declaratory relief, including specific performance.
2. Liquidated damages of $ 250,000,000.00 that decrease every five
years
3. Termination of the Non-Relocation Agreement.
18 1
4. All other remedies available at law or equity.
Seattle Mariners
The Mariners began playing in Safeco Field in 2000. The Lease does not
have a section solely dedicated to relocation. The lease does contain a section
that entitles the Public Facilities District to specific enforcement. The parties
(the Team and District) agree that:

175. AMENDED AND RESTATED LEASE AND MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN DENVER
METROPOLITAN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM DISTRICT AND COLORADO ROCKIES BASEBALL

CLUB, LTD., MARCH 30, 1995, art. XIII, at 79 (1995).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id
180. NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN HARRIS COUNTY SPORTS AUTHORITY AND
HOUSTONMcLANE COMPANY, INC DIBIA HOUSTONASTROS BASEBALL CLUB, 1998 (1998).

181. Id.
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1. Playing games at Safeco Field is a "unique and valuable
consideration which cannot be replaced by the payment of money and
is the essence of the bargain."
2. The stadium was constructed to secure Major League Baseball for
the area and the economic benefits produced from Major League
Baseball for the entire term of the lease.
3. The entire area "could not adequately or properly be compensated
in damages" if the team relocated.
4. The uncertainty regarding a potential departure would cause
"irreparable, non-measurable harm to the District and citizens"
5. The District is entitled to injunctive relief without posting any
bond, specific performance, termination, and all other remedies at law
or equity.18 2
Milwaukee Brewers
The Brewers moved into Miller Park in 2001. The Brewers signed a NonRelocation Agreement with the Southeast Wisconsin Professional Baseball
Park District ("District"). The Brewers acknowledge that the State of
Wisconsin agreed to finance the stadium and infrastructure to keep the
Brewers in the City of Milwaukee. The Brewers acknowledge that the District
will be "irreparably harmed" by relocation and will have "no adequate remedy
at law."' 183 The Brewers are prohibited from contract, agreement, or
application that could result in relocation. The Brewers consent to a
"temporary restraining order, together with preliminary and permanent
injunction" without a bond. 184 The District can also terminate agreements to
which the Brewers are a party.
PittsburghPirates
The Pirates began playing in PNC Park in 2001. Article 8.2 of the lease is
entitled "Covenant Not to Relocate." The Pirates agree not to relocate or
initiate discussions that might result in relocation. Article 8.3 of the lease is
entitled "Unique Nature of Agreement." The Pirates agree that relocation will

182. BALLPARK OPERATIONS AND LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLICFACILITIES DISTRICT AND THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LLP,

DEC. 23, 1996, art. XIX, at 78-81 (1996).
183. GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 415-16.
184. Id.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

result in "immediate and irreparable harm." Thus, the Sports & Exhibition
Authority of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County is entitled to injunctive relief or
specific performance without bond. The Pirates waive the defense that
damages can be adequately compensated. The Authority can pursue all other
remedies at law, but the maximum damages cannot exceed an amount
specified in a separate loan agreement.
St. Louis Cardinals
The St. Louis Cardinals had signed a Project Construction,Financingand
Operation Agreement with the City of St. Louis to play in a new stadium as
part of an extensive project called "Ballpark Village."
The financing
legislation for "Ballpark Village" was rejected by the State of Missouri's
Legislature. The agreement that the Cardinals signed contained one of the
most onerous relocation clauses in professional sports. Section 12.3 of the
Project Construction Financing and Operating Agreement states that both
parties acknowledge and agree that:
1. The Ballpark Project is being constructed and the Ballpark Project
Bonds are being issued to enable the Cardinals to play their Home
Games in the Ballpark.
2. The Agreement is intended to "ensure" the Cardinals will not
relocate.
3. "Particular and highly unique circumstances" have given rise to the
Agreement.
4. The Public will be "immediately, uniquely, and irreparably
harmed" by any violation of the Agreement.
5. Monetary damages cannot be calculated in the event the Cardinals
breach the Agreement.
6. The Public Participants do not have an adequate remedy at law for
a breach by the Cardinals.
7. The "economic, financial, civic, and social benefits" to the Public
Participants are great and are not quantifiable.
8. The Public Participants are therefore entitled to one, but not both,
of two remedies at law:
i.Injunctive relief, specific performance, or any other preliminary
or permanent equitable relief.
ii.Liquidated Damages equal to the proceeds of Ballpark Project
Bonds for the first year. Each year the amount is to be reduced by
1/35.185

185.

PROJECT CONSTRUCTION, FINANCING AND OPERATION AGREEMENT, ST. Louis CARDINALS
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NON-RELOCATION CLAUSE

FINANCED

Baltimore

Camden
Yards

Denver

Coors Field

Houston

Minute Maid
Park

$210

96%

All remedies available at law
or equity, including specific
performance and injunctive
relief
No waiver of defenses or

1995

$215

75%

2000

$250

68%

Team acknowledges: the
District will suffer
"irreparable harm", and does
ot have an adequate remedy
atlaw
Team recognized the
construction, tax, and bonds
were issued solely for the
Team to play in the District.
District is entitled to seek an
njunction and specific
erformance without bond.
Non-Relocation Agreement
Signed between Team and
County
Relocation, Attempted
Relocation, Failure to Play in
Stadium, MLB Permission to
relocate, third party
egotiations, and bankruptcy
Ilconstitute "Event of
efault".
our Remedies Available
1. Injunctive or Declaratory
elief
including, without
imitation, specific
erformance
.Liquidated Damages: 1998
003 $ 250,000,000
003-2008 $ 200,000,000
008-2013 $ 150,000,000
013-2018 $ 125,000,000
018-2023 $ 100,000,000
023- $ 75,000,000
.Terminate Agreement
*Exercise any and all other
emedies available to at law

1992

by Orioles.

I__rights

pr equity

MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUB, § 12.3 (2002).
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Milwaukee

Miller Park

2001

$393

77%

Pittsburgh

?NC
Stadium

2001

$260

82%

Seattle

Safeco Field

2000

$517

76%

[Vol. 15:1

Non-Relocation Agreement
Signed between Team and
District
Terms: "Baseball beneficial
tothe State," State agreed to
Infrastructure and "Stadium
greement" as inducement
for team to play in the State,
"Irreparably Harmed by
Relocation,"
No adequate remedy at law,
"Team hereby consents to the
entry of, a temporary
restraining order, together
with preliminary and
permanent injunction."
Without Bond. District can
Terminate agreement
Team acknowledges the new
tadium is a "material
inducement" for team to play
inPittsburgh. Team
acknowledges "unique
nature" of
agreement and irreparable
arm. Authority entitled to
specific performance without
bond.
eam waives right to assert
the defense that there is
adequate monetary
compensation.
Authority can assert any other
claim at law or equity.
Failure to comply with
agreement (includes default
by relocation) would result in
'immediate and irreparable
damage".
No adequate remedy at law.
186
ad all other remedies.

Newer leases in Major League Baseball have non-relocation clauses; some
coupled with liquidated damages as well. These leases specify equitable
remedies such as specific performance and injunction as appropriate action to
maintain the team at home. By virtue of the public input and commitment into
the construction, ownership, and financing of sports facilities, any attempted
franchise carpet-bagging will immediately, uniquely, and irreparably harm the
community/public. Monetary damages cannot be calculated, estimated, or

186. GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 414-18.
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ascertained with any certainty with respect to the loss of the psychic income
and intangible benefits to a community. "The substantial out-of-pocket costs
of public subsidization spent on local sports [venues] generally exceed the
objectively quantifiable economic benefits to the community ....Therefore,
the 'benefit of the bargain' that the community actually [has] in exchange for
its ... subsidy" is the covenant that the team remains at home. 187 As a result,

the community does not have an adequate remedy of law. Therefore,
communities should be entitled to injunctive relief, specific performance or
any other preliminary or permanent type of equitable relief. That is not to say
that the lease should not be coupled with an alternative; i.e., a liquidated
damage amount specified in the lease in the event of relocation if the parties
agree. A liquidated damages provision would protect both the community and
the team. A team that legitimately cannot survive in the community should
have a reasonable way out of its lease. To insure that the team is not carpetbagging, specific triggering devices should be included in the lease. The
triggering devices could be a function of revenue, attendance, the team's
financial position, or a combination of these factors.
Sports teams have engaged in franchise free agency by moving or
threatening to move the teams to cities with better sweetheart deals. This type
of conduct has created a "seller's market." By selecting the best available
offer, a team can enhance a franchise's profitability and capitalized value at
taxpayer expense. As long as the public continues to subsidize state-of-the-art
facilities, non-relocation clauses are essential to stop the game of musical
chairs. "Courts have suggested that a stadium lease is the most effective
means of protecting a community's investment in the playing facility that
188
houses a professional franchise."
A publicly owned facility has a symbiotic relationship with its host city.
The franchise benefits from public funds spent in connection with the
construction and subsidization of the facility, and the community benefits from
the team playing in the community as a unique form of entertainment that is
irreplaceable if lost. Economic benefits from hosting a sports franchise are
difficult to determine and are probably too speculative to recover as contract
damages. A professional sports franchise is a unique community asset that
cannot be readily replaced. Courts will not have much difficulty in finding
"irreparable harm to the 'welfare, recreation, prestige, prosperity, and trade and

187. Matthew Mitten & Bruce Burton, ProfessionalSports FranchiseRelocations From Private
Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the
Need for A Level PlayingField, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 60 (1997).
188. Id. at 71.
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commerce' of the city's residents," by virtue of loss of a sports franchise. 189
6.

Conclusion

The holding of the Minnesota Court of Appeals could have a significant
impact on sports franchises and "franchise free agency." Although the case
was not decided on its merits, other courts could apply the same reasoning to
prevent a local sports franchise from relocating. The court held that a team
could be prevented from relocating if the relocation violated the lease
agreement for. the facility. The court stated "the relationship between the
Twins and the Commission is not a typical landlord-tenant relationship, but
instead provides the state, citizens, and fans with substantial non-monetary
benefits." 190 Monetary damages would not be an adequate remedy for the
breach of the lease by the team. 191 The potential impacts from the Minnesota
Court of Appeals decision are:
Sports facility leases are not typical commercial leases. As such,
monetary considerations are not the benefit received by the facility
owner; instead, the benefit of the bargain was the team's promise to
play its home games at the stadium for the duration of the lease.
Teams being prevented from relocating even if they are willing to pay
damages.
The recognition that merely allowing a facility landlord to recover
contract damages for the premature loss of a team does not provide
adequate compensation for the lost benefit of the bargain in providing
the public financial inducements necessary to attract and retain a
sports franchise, as value of such benefits is virtually impossible to
quantify and, therefore, not recoverable. for a team owner's breach of
contract.
MLB or other professional sports leagues facing tortuous interference
claims.
Liquidated damage provisions being essential for teams in order to
escape their leases.
Because the relationship between a community and a sports franchise is
greater than that of a landlord and a tenant, the lease agreements must be
"greater," also. To ensure that "psychic income" can be used in the future to

189. Id.
190. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 638 N.W.2d at 221.
191. Id.
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prevent relocation, communities have put specific language, which outlines the
non-monetary benefits and uniqueness of the relationship in the lease with the
team. Newer leases also grant the community the right to injunctive relief and
specific performance. The Minnesota Court of Appeals holding suggests that
a community with a well-written non-relocation clause in its lease agreement
with a sports franchise can prevent a team from relocating. If a team needs to
relocate for legitimate reasons, the lease should contain a liquidated damages
clause with specific events that would allow the team to "buy-out" of the lease.
192
IV. "THE BOOM IN SPORTS VENUES HAS SHIFTED"'

2003 marked another busy year for the opening of new and renovated
sports venues in North America. The total construction costs for major league,
minor league, and collegiate facilities were $1.456 billion. 193 Most of us
would think that the bulk of the dollars went to the major league facilities, but
in reality, $959 million came from college and minor league new facilities
and/or major renovations. 194 While major league stadiums continue to open
their doors, the trend for new or renovated venues have shifted to the college
and minor league level.
Planned facility spending in 2003 dropped to a three-year low of $5.4
billion. Forty-five new construction or renovation projects were underway in
2003 and only ten facilities began construction at the NFL, NBA, MLB, and
NHL level compared to sixteen facilities in 2002 and thirteen facilities in
2001. Seven out of the ten venues are open or are scheduled to be open by
April of 2004, leaving only three venues for 2004 and on. 195 The main reason
is that the Big Four team sports are slowly gravitating toward a fully mature
market. Seventy-two percent of facilities in the four major leagues have been
built since 1990. Of the four major leagues' 121 professional franchises, 74
teams are either playing in 64 facilities built since 1990 or currently
96
constructing new facilities. 1

192. This section of the article is taken from Martin Greenberg, FacilitiesArms Race, FOR THE
RECORD, April/May 2001, at 4. Where necessary, some information has been cited back to this
original source.
193. College, Minors Drink Bulk of $1.SB Arena Tab, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., Nov.
24-30, 2003, at 37.
194. Id.
195. FacilitiesSpending Drops to $5.4B, Hits 3-year Low, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J.,
Apr. 14-20, 2003, at 41.
196. Id.
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College FacilitiesArms Race
Institutions of higher learning are experiencing an unprecedented boom in
the creation of new and renovation of old sports facilities. While fans have
become accustomed to flashy stadiums and arenas in the professional ranks,
collegiate programs have quietly been spending billions of dollars on their
own new sports venues. Over $4 billion was spent on collegiate athletic
facilities in the 1990's. 197 Further statistics demonstrate this trend:
1. Nearly three dozen schools across the country have either recently
completed
or are in the midst of sports facility projects, creating
approximately
305,000 new seats. 198
2. Ten of the [fifteen] Division 1-A schools that averaged 75,000 fans
or more for a football game over the past four seasons have engaged in
99
stadium expansion.1
3. Nine out of twelve schools in the Big 12 conference have already
2 00
undergone facility renovations.
The situation at Penn State University is a representative example. Penn
State's Beaver Stadium has gone through 7 expansions since it opened in 1960,
doubling its size. When the expansions are completed, the stadium will reach
20 1
a capacity of 104,000, making it the second-largest stadium in the nation.
Other examples of college construction for both stadiums and arenas include:
COLLEGE CONSTRUCTION

202

SCHOOL

FACILITY

COST MILLIONS

COMPLETI
ON DATE

Univ. Southern
California

10,258 seat arena

$70

2006

St. Louis Univ.

13,000 seat arena

$70

2005

197. Greenberg, supra note 192, at 4.
198. Id.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
On Deck- Venues in Development, RSV FAX, Jan. 7, 2004.
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Univ. of Oregon

15,000 seat arena

$130

2006

Univ. of Virginia

15,000 seat arena-John Paul

$130

2006

$23

2004

Jones Arena
Gonzaga Univ.

6,000 seat basketball arena

FOOTBALL STADIUM UPGRADES

20 3

SCHOOL

COSTMILLIONS

COMPLETION
DATE

Michigan State Univ.

$61

2005

Univ. of Nebraska

$49

2006

Univ. of Oklahoma

$34

2006

Oklahoma State Univ.

$86

2004

Univ. of Wisconsin

$99.7

2004

In the midst of this construction, many worry that the race to build the best
stadium or arena is obscuring the mission of colleges and universities, which
should be to educate students. However, others point out that this facilities
arms race has a positive impact on both new student enrollment and alumni
20 4
support of an institution.
The Nature of the "Race"
The college building boom has mimicked the proliferation of new major
and minor league sports facilities in the 1990's, when approximately eighty
20 5
major league and seventy minor league facilities were built or renovated.
The college market has also mirrored the professional level in the types of
amenities that have been found in these new facilities. These amenities
203. Id.
204. Greenberg, supra note 192, at 4.
205. Id.
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include club seats and luxury suites, increased capacity, improved concession
areas, branded food areas, improved practice facilities, parking garages,
modem locker room and training facilities, athletic administration and support
buildings, state-of-the-art scoreboard and video equipment, Walk of Fames
and Hall of Fames, and auxiliary real estate development. All of these create
new revenue streams that benefit more than just the athletic department.
As at the professional level, projects are often undertaken as part of a
larger capital plan and are actually accomplished in stages. Schools are not
just focusing the building boom on the traditionally big revenue sport, football.
Instead, money is being put into hockey arenas, soccer fields, swimming
complexes and training facilities.
The proliferation of college sports facilities has been referred to as part of
the "athletics arms race." In 1997, sports law professor Gary Roberts told
Congress that colleges are involved in an arms race or "mentality in which
upward-spiraling
bigger is always seen as better. It creates a never-ending,
20 6
need for more revenues in order to beat the other guy."
This has also led to concern from college administrators. In his 2001
convention address, NCAA President Cedric Dempsey said that academic
institutions must put the brakes on the explosive growth in college sports, and
recently he has forecast a looming "financial fall" in college sports because of
the arms race. 20 7 Miles Brand, president of Indiana University - Bloomington,
said,
I am a strong believer that inter-collegiate athletics can increase pride
in the institution, strengthen ties to alumni, students, faculty, and the
broader community, and provide educational opportunities to some
students who might not otherwise have a chance to earn a degree, but I
also worry that those positive aspects are being overshadowed in
University athletic
pursuit of increased sport-related revenue.
programs run the risk of becoming captives of commercialism and the
Universities must be judged by their
entertainment culture.
not as sports franchises. 20 8
institutions,
academic
as
achievement
However, few can deny that the increased revenue from new stadiums and
arenas helps increase the profile of the university. For example, television
exposure, which often follows stadium renovation or construction, helps
schools attract not only the best athletes, but also strong faculty and a growing

206. Id
207. Cedric Dempsey, 2001 NCAA Convention Address, Jan. 7, 2001,
http://www.ncaa.org/convention/2001/address.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
208. Id.

available at
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general enrollment. This positioning of the school's name in the media is one
of the crucial functions of an athletic program.
Why the Race is Run
The collegiate venue may be the newfound revenue source that can
augment or compliment bowl, cable television and ticket revenue. Colleges
have followed professional teams and realized that club seats, personal seat
licenses, luxury suites, naming rights, integrated sponsorships and
unprecedented corporate alliances are just as appealing sources of revenue. In
many instances, collegiate facilities are physically and functionally obsolete,
antiquated, potentially unsafe, and in need of substantial renovation or even
replacement. Storied venues with historic significance just simply do not meet
the demands of corporate America, the media and the new breed of fan.
Effective stadium design can actually contribute to a venue's financial
success in ways previously unimagined. A general contractor, architect, or
facility manager may be as important as a coach in luring top recruits to a
campus. The physical act of construction may be symbolic to recruits in the
form of a financial commitment to the continuation and development of the
athletic program. The investment in state-of-the-art facilities may also enable
potential recruits to attain their full athletic potential by providing the best
athletic equipment for training and developing their skills. If a school does not
have a state-of-the-art facility that is competitive with other universities, it is
not going to be able to recruit the quality of athlete necessary to win.
Traditional values such as competition, loyalty, cooperation, and
teamwork are still a major part of college athletics, but college sport today has
become just as much about bowl games, alumni support, endowments, gate
receipts, and cable TV contracts. The failure to win can cause swindling
attendance, shrinking contributions, turnover in the coaching staff, and lead
students to turn down scholarships.
Winning also translates into increased revenues. Estimated per-team
payouts for 2003 Bowl appearances have skyrocketed.
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BOWL PAYOUTS2 09

Bowl

Million per team

Outback

$2.0

Capital One (formerly Citrus Bowl)

5.125

Rose

$13.5

Orange

$13.5

Cotton

$3.0

Fiesta

$13.5

$13.5
Sugar
These bowls pump millions into athletic programs each year. The
expansion number of Bowls played and the purses offered have been
determining factors in the quest for revenues and exposure. There were
twenty-eight Bowl games in 2003-2004 with a total of $202 million paid to
universities. Thirteen Bowl games pay less than $1 million, but more than the
minimum of $750,000 that is required by the NCAA. 210 Eleven Bowls pay
between $1 million to $2 million. BCS Bowl games pay between $14 million
that year.
and $17 million depending upon who has the championship
211
them.
to
attached
names
corporate
have
Twenty-one Bowls
Another factor is the increasing popularity of sports such as football,
leading to a demand for better and newer facilities to maintain and create a
new fan base.
NCAA 2003 Division I-A football attracted more than 35 million fans for
the 2003-2004 season. 2 12 Total attendance is up 701,382 from the prior
year.2 13 Twenty-one Division I-A teams for the 2003-2004 season averaged
2 14
more than 70,000 in attendance.

at
http://www.sportsfansofamerica.com/links/
NCAA
Bowl
Payouts,
209. 2003
football/college/bowls/2003.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 2003 NCAA Football Attendance, NCAA Official Statistics, at http://www.ncaa.org/stats/

football/attendance/2003/2003footballattendance.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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2003 DIVISION I-A HOME FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE - 70,000 OR MORE

Rank / School

Average Attendance

I Michigan

110,918

2 Penn State

105,629

3 Tennessee

105,038

4 Ohio State

104,870

5 Georgia

92,058

6 LSU

90,974

7 Florida

90,177

8 Auburn

85,203

9 Texas

83,339

10 Oklahoma

83,202

11 Florida State

83,149

12 Alabama

82,388

13 South Carolina

80,844

14 Notre Dame

80,795

15 Wisconsin

78,486

16 Southern California

77,804

17 Nebraska

77,754

18 Texas A&M

76,243

19 Clemson

76,079

20 Michigan State

72,830

21 Washington

71,906

215. Id.
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TOTAL ATTENDANCE 2003216

Div. 1-A Teams:

32,850,270

Including Neutral Sites & Bowl Games:

35,085,646

Div. I-AA Teams:

5,200,384

Including Neutral Sites & Championship Games:

6,070,116

Profitable football programs, which lead to bigger and better sports
venues, can also underwrite non-revenue and women's sports. According to
the director of the NCAA study, Daniel L. Fulks, the difference between I-A
programs that show profits and those that do not can be attributed to seating
2 17
capacity and revenue sharing within conferences.
Some universities use new stadiums as a means to move up the division
ladder. For instance, Alabama State may soon become the first historically
black college to join college football's top level, Division I-A. The school's
$70 million stadium proposal includes naming rights for the stadium, playing
field, and a National Black Sports Hall of Fame and Museum that would be
2 18
housed in the stadium.
The growth of college hockey from a regional to national sport may also
give rise to further growth in facility construction for colleges without major
football and basketball programs. Hockey may provide a relatively
inexpensive vehicle for marketing an athletic program. Today there are 20%
more Division I hockey teams than there were eight years ago, and two new
conferences. There are now six conferences with a total of sixty schools that
2 19
participate in Division I-A Hockey.
A perfect example in college hockey is Colorado College. Despite a
student population of only 1,950, the school went to two NCAA Frozen Fours
in the 90s, and hosts powerhouse schools such as Michigan State, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin. 220 A Western College Hockey Association (WCHA) charter
member since 1959, the college is building the new World Arena, which will
216. Id.
217. Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses of Division I and 1I Intercollegiate Athletic
Programs-FinancialTrends and Relationships(NCAA, 1999).
218. Gary T. Brown, News and Features-Notes, NCAA NEWS, June 5, 2000, available at

http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000605/active/3712n22.html.
219. NCAA, Conferences and Schools, NCAA SPORTS.COM,
http://www.ncaasports.com/ icehockey/mens/story/arcstory/9711.

Jan.

1,

2002,

at

220. Luke DeCock, The Growth of College Hockey-Hockey seeks nationalfocus, THE GAZETrE,

Feb. 5, 2000.
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have an increased seating capacity from 3,829 to 7,343, doubling ticket
revenues. 22 1 Colorado College is not the only school to follow suit in the
WCHA. Four other colleges have built new arenas in the past few years, and
222
North Dakota recently completed a $50 million, 11,000-seat arena.
Naming rights deals have played a significant role in this progress. The
University of Louisville named its new $63 million football facility Papa
John's Cardinal Stadium after the pizza chain paid approximately $5 million
for the naming rights. 2 23 The 42,000-seat facility also includes a Brown &
Williamson Club built with a $3 million contribution from the tobacco
224
company.
Penn State's athletic facilities are now decorated with logos for Pepsi,
Unimart, AT&T, Hershey Foods, Nike, Mellon Bank, and Toyota, among
others. A huge new electronic scoreboard towering over the north end zone of
Beaver Stadium is being paid for with corporate advertising.
By 2000, approximately fifteen colleges had corporate naming rights deals
for their arenas and stadiums. As long as the sponsorships are perceived as
merely supporting the athletic programs, without implying that the advertising
has some negative impact on the education at these schools, little damage is
done to the respective school's reputation as an institution of higher learning.
COLLEGE NAMING RIGHTS AGREEMENTS

UNIVERSITY

STADIUM/ARENA

YEAR

TERM

2 25

CORPORATE
SPONSOR

FUNDS
($)M

Arizona State
Univ.

Wells Fargo Arena

1998

10

Wells Fargo

5.0

Fresno State
Univ.

Save Mart Center

2003

20

Save Mart Co.

40.0

Marquette
Univ.

US Cellular Arena

1999

6

US Cellular Corp.

2.0

North Dakota
Univ.

First National Bank
Center

N/A

20

First National
Bank

7.2

221. Id.
222.
223.
7K.
224.
225.

Id.
Janet Graham, Louisville Ready to Open 'Miracle'Stadium, KENT. POST, Sept., 2, 1998, at
Id.
GREENBERG, supra note 79, at 327.
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Value City Arena at
the
Schottenstein Center

1998

N/A

Value City

Oregon State
Univ.

Reset Stadium

1999

10

Al Reser

5.0

San Diego State
Univ. 228

Cox Pavilion

1997

10

Cox
Communications

7.9

Syracuse Univ.

Carrier Dome

1980

N/A

Carrier Airconditioning

2.75

Texas Tech
Univ.

United Spirit Arena

1999

N/A

United Airlines

10.0

Univ. of
Louisville 229

Papa John's Cardinal
Stad.

1998

10

Papa John's Pizza

5.0

Univ. of
Maryland

Comcast Center

2002

25

Comcast Corp.

20.0

Univ. of Miami
(FL)

Ryder Center

2002

N/A

Ryder Systems,
Inc.

9.0

Univ. of
MinnesotaMankato

Midwest Wireless
Center at Mankato

N/A

20

Midwest Wireless

6.0

Univ. of
Washington

Seafirst Arena at Hec
Edmundson Pavilion

2000

10

Seafirst Bank

9.0

Univ. of
WisconsinGreen Bay

Resch Center

2002

N/A

Resch

4.8

Ohio State
Univ. 226

12.5227

Enhanced seating has also been responsible for the acceleration in facility
development. A good example is the arena at Ohio State University called the
Schottenstein Center. Named after Jerome Schottenstein, the founder of the
Value City discount retail chain, the center was built for $110 million and
contains forty-six luxury boxes. 230 The suites sell for $45,000 to $65,000 per

226. NCAA Division 1-A Football and Basketball Facility Naming-Rights Deals, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Dec. 29-Jan. 4, 2003, at 14.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gilbert M. Gaul & Frank Fitzpatrick, On Campus, an Edifice Complex- Football and
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year, with a 5-year commitment. Moreover, to purchase club seats for Ohio
State basketball, a fan must pay a $15,000 seat-licensing fee, commit to forty
years worth of tickets, and pay an annual $2,000 maintenance fee.
Universities may also be using new facilities to bring sport back to the
campus. Southern Methodist University (SMU) averages 18,000 fans a game
23 1
The
at the Cotton Bowl, leaving a 70,000-seat stadium virtually empty.
campus,
SMU
on
the
facility
a
32,000-seat
Ford
Stadium,
new Gerald J.
includes twenty-two suites that rent on a three to five-year basis for $25,000
per year plus tickets and refreshments, a stadium club, a glass-enclosed area
on the west side of the field which provides 550 theater-style seats that go for
$75 per game, and most importantly, SMU will control all revenues at the
232
stadium.
Where Is the Money Coming From?
Colleges and universities throughout the nation have raised staggering
amounts of money to construct new sports facilities, or to refurbish and
modernize existing venues. In many instances, the money is coming from the
state or other governmental units, land donations, material donations,
charitable donations, and vendor contributions. In other instances, students are
assessed specific fees that are dedicated to repayment of facility debt. A final
option is to dedicate revenues generated from new construction or renovation
to the repayment of bonds in the form of contractually obligated income.
The Building Will Continue.
The ultimate question in the facilities arms race is whether the
construction of sports venues improves or damages the reputation of a college
or university.
There is little doubt that universities benefit from the construction of new
sports facilities. While some may question the appropriateness of spending
money on such facilities instead of academics, the reality is that successful
sports programs in attractive buildings raise alumni awareness about the
school. As a result, alumni donors are more likely to keep the institution in
mind for donations toward academic programs if the sports programs are
flourishing.

Basketball Teams are Under Constant Pressure to Succeed, Not Only on the Court and on the Field
but at the Box Office, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 12, 2000, at AO1.
231. Richard Alm, Stadium a Selling Pointfor SMU, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 22, 2000, at
IF.
232. Id.
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At the same time, new facilities bring enhanced media coverage, which
increases the number of applications that a college or university receives from
prospective students around the country. Sports programs in venues with
positive revenue streams, such as a successful college football or basketball
program, can more readily cover the cost of non-revenue sports and expanded
athletic programs for women.
There is also a substantial positive intangible aspect associated with new
sports facilities that cannot be ignored. The general enthusiasm surrounding a
successful sports program is an important part of creating a positive
atmosphere on college campuses around the country. It is hard to deny that
the presence of 100,000 fans at a University of Michigan football game can
create a general sense of excitement about the school. The same can be said
for dozens of programs throughout the country.
It is clear that colleges and universities must be aware of the potential
animosity that can arise between student athletes and the rest of the university
community when millions are funneled into athletic venues while academics
suffer. Schools also run a risk when they begin to sell substantial advertising
in sports venues.
Yet, for generations universities have built sports programs because they
foster school spirit and community involvement. The economic landscape has
changed over time and new sports venues are now required to maintain those
qualities on the college campus. A university does not sacrifice its primary
educational mission just by building a new sports venue. In fact, many would
argue that the mission is actually enhanced when a new stadium or arena is
complete.
In the end, regardless of whether administrators, fans, and athletes support
or oppose the construction of new sports venues on college campuses, the
reality is that construction will continue. The revenue and fundraising
potential that new facilities offer to those schools is just too much to pass up.
V.

"IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO BUILD A SPORTS FACILITY"

Sports facility development is really real estate development. A sports
facility complex is nothing more than a building that leases space for
entertainment and sports venue users (team matches, rodeo, monster truck
rallies, concerts, shows, etc.).
To obtain and maintain sports franchises in any community, major or
secondary, governmental units will be required to pay a municipal entitlement
or franchise fee. A municipal entitlement or franchise fee is the public
(taxpayer's) investment in the form of tax dollars to obtain or maintain a sports
franchise.
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While the economic benefits generated by sports venues are debatable, the
"psychic income" is not. New or renovated sports venues create architectural
landmarks, fulfill public purposes, and produce new tax revenues and media
exposure for teams and cities.
In most communities, the building or renovation of a sports venue has
created happenstance real estate and economic development surrounding the
venue. This piecemeal building leads to "Concentric Circles" of development
surrounding the sports venue.
Whether sports venues jump start real estate development or whether real
estate has already occurred and is further augmented by the construction or
renovation of the sports venue, there is enough concrete evidence in both
major and secondary cities that the creation of sports facilities will have a
rippling effect of creating real estate and economic development in the
surrounds of the facility.
That which surrounds the renovated or newly constructed facility may be
the most tangible of economic benefits that sports facilities produce. In a
community, it may convert the image of a league, team, or its owner from tax
vulture into long-term visionary.
Moreover, a newly constructed venue can bring complete renewal and
revitalization of blighted areas, environmentally hazardous sites, aged
communities, or downtown areas.
The key is to plan the development. Imagine an area surrounding the new
or renovated sports facility where those Concentric Circles are not
happenstance, rather, they are a Master Planned Sports and Entertainment
Facility: A Sports.Comm.
A Sports.Comm would involve private entrepreneurs working in concert
with local municipalities and its planners to guarantee a planned community
integrating the sports venue and surrounding community to generate tangible
benefits and a return on the taxpayer's investment.
A Sports.Comm contemplates a blend of land uses, mixed uses that
integrates the sports facility with neighborhood needs including condos,
apartments, offices, hotels, restaurants, sports bars, shopping areas, theaters,
museums, libraries, parking structures, green areas and public spaces, and
neighborhood services.
The ultimate goal of a Sports.Comm is the creation of a destination place,
a new way of life, and an economic and real estate rejuvenation of an area.
The environment or ingredients necessary in order to create a
Sports.Comm include:
e Need or desire for new or renovated venue(s) (existence of. substandard venue 15+ years old);
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* A municipality which sees a sports facility as the centerpiece for real
estate development;
e Current use of surrounding area.
Blighted, environmentally
impacted, or underdeveloped areas are preferable;
o Availability and willingness of local government to utilize tax
incremental financing;
o Availability of public funding, ample bonding capacity, availability
of special tax levies or excess capacity from current levels, economic
development resources, etc.
o Market demand for premium seating and corporate base to support
sponsorships and naming rights;
o Existence of poorly managed teams that are losing money or no
teams currently in the market;
* Availability of publicly-owned or acquired properties that have
strong site characteristics and strong potential of adjacent
development
o Potential of acquiring development rights on adjacent parcels
o Adjacent to public infrastructure (transit, roads, parking, etc.)
* Sufficient surrounding area to accommodate auxiliary development;
" Availability of land and assemblage possibilities;
o Condemnation power (quick take) of the City to deliver surrounding
land;
o Flexible zoning laws to allow for multi-use development and
density;
o Potential of college team(s) supplementing pro team anchor
tenant(s);
o A cooperative municipality that is willing to provide incentives,
including:
o Roadway and infrastructure construction
o Beautification
o Enhancements
o Utilities
o Parking
o Leasing of property developed
" Tax abatement
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o Condemnation and assistance with assemblage of land
purchases
o Reduction of impact fees
o Expedited permitting and approval
o Waiver of various development requirements
o Creating mixed use zoning
Some of America's deteriorating inner cities have provided the perfect
testing ground for real estate development in conjunction with sports facility
development. Some new downtown sports facilities have had a major positive
economic impact on local and surrounding areas. Cleveland, Baltimore,
Denver, and Detroit are some of the pioneers in using sports facilities to
redevelop previously downtrodden areas. These redevelopments are leading
examples of how sports and entertainment facilities can be used to resurrect
2 3
communities and spark an economic boom. 3
A. Baltimore. Baltimore's Camden Yards was the first ballpark to be
utilized as a magnet for urban development. 234 Before Camden Yards,
residents of Baltimore had no reason to go downtown. The strategic
placement of the stadium downtown has brought people and businesses like
bars, restaurants, and retail shopping back into the city. This flock of people
and new businesses produced a resurrection of Baltimore's Inner Harbor
area. 235 The Citizens of Baltimore are now going downtown to do their
shopping and dining, and to enjoy the other cultural events that make urban
life special.
B. Cleveland. In Cleveland, planners strategically located Jacob's Field
and Gund Arena to stimulate economic growth and development. Cleveland,
however, did not see the same intense level of success that occurred in
Baltimore and Denver because they had already started on a plan for
redevelopment before the stadium was built.236 Although Cleveland has not
incorporated the stadiums into the surrounding neighborhood as much as in
other cities, Jacob's Field and Gund Arena did help to jumpstart more

233. Report on the Mayor's Task Force,Economic Impacts and Social Benefits of the Padres, at
http://www.padres.com/ballpark/mtf/mtfIV1 .html.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Jim McCartney, In the Right Community, New Ballpark can be Boon, PIONEER PLANET,
Nov. 17, 1996, availableat http://www.pioneerplanet.com/archieve/newstadiumi/dox/coorI I 17.htm.
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development in the surrounding "Gateway" area. 2 37 They have used some of
this new commercial development to draw additional residential and business
tenants to the upper floors of buildings. The addition of Cleveland Browns
Stadium, which is located near the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, will further
attract business to the area.
C. Denver. The redevelopment of Denver's Lower Downtown ("LoDo")
district was based on the success that occurred in Baltimore and Cleveland.
An immediate result of the downtown location of Coors Field has been a
population increase, and a swell in the number of area businesses. 23 8 People
now live in and use the area around the stadium that was once a run-down
warehouse district. A study by the St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce
23 9
illustrates the economic impact of Denver's Coors Field on the LoDo area:
" Eighteen new restaurants opened
" Population in the area has nearly doubled
" The residential base of LoDo is approximately 3,000 units with
another 1,600 units expected
* Downtown Denver Partnership Inc. estimates the direct and indirect
impact in downtown at over $200 million (when including increases in
related sales and new jobs at area restaurants, stores and hotels)
D. Detroit. Detroit's Comerica Park was built with the hope of following
the success that Denver had with Coors Field. Although the older Tiger
stadium was in the city, it was not downtown. It was built in 1912 and did not
have any of the modern day amenities that make stadiums into enormous
revenue generators. The new ballpark has helped stimulate renovation of
surrounding buildings like the prestigious Detroit Athletic Club. 240 It has also
helped to attract new business to the area like restaurants, nightclubs, movie
theaters, and there are plans for a casino and entertainment complex. The new
football stadium, Ford Field, which will be home to the Lions, is being built
just east of Comerica Park and will provide yet another surge into the local
economy. 24 1 This use of a sports facility as an anchor in redevelopment has
237. Id.
238. Report, supra note 233.
239. Id.
240. Jeff Houck, Urban Revival, Tiger's New $300 Million Ballpark Key to City's Future, April
10, 2000, at http://www.foxsportsbiz.com.
241. Raad Cawthon, Detroit Banks on Central Stadium, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 29, 2000, at
AO1.
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already begun to bring back life to a once derelict city.
Only a handful of projects such as the ones afore-referenced have
delivered as advertised and pumped life either into downtowns that were dead
or in disrepair. But according to the SportsBusiness Journal article Pipe
Dream or Pay Dirt? Sports-Driven Projects a Tough Sell, "most
developments have failed outright, underachieved or only recently begun to
stir after several years of slumber. While many of those projects generate
enough tax revenue to justify the cost to build them, few have proved to be the
anchors that development-hungry communities had hoped for."242 "Ballpark
financiers have learned the hard way that while a sports facility may add to
quality of life and drive traffic on game nights, it typically is not, by itself, an
impetus to build hotels, condominiums, or offices. The sports projects that
have come together most quickly have been integrated into communities rather
243
than dropped into the middle of them and expected to swim on their own."
Tom Hicks, owner of the Texas Rangers and Dallas Stars, planned
massive development projects around both the Ballpark at Arlington
and American Airlines Center. Neither has come together as
originally planned. "Built as the centerpiece to a proposed 270-acre
development, the [B]allpark [at Arlington] languished alone in an
open, highway-side stretch between Dallas and Fort Worth until 2004
when Siemens moved about 700 employees into a 230,000 square foot
complex that is split between a three-story office building and a onestory research building." 244 When the "American Airlines Center
opened in Dallas in 2001, Hicks and former Mavericks owner Ross
Perot, Jr. [created] Victory, a 72-acre mixed-use development plan
that would connect the downtown area utilizing the [American
Airlines A]rena as the centerpiece with office towers, residents, [and
other real estate development] filling in around it." Victory recently
began to show signs of energy with the announcement that the upscale
245
"W" hotel chain would open a high-rise adjacent to the arena.
"Nationwide Arena, which opened in September 2000 as home to the
NHL's Columbus Blue Jackets, is among the few examples of a sports
facility combined with real estate development that actually worked
according to plan," said Bill Rhoda, principal with CSL Consulting of

242. Pipe Dream or Pay Dirt? Sports Driven Projects a Tough Sell, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
BUS. J., Mar. 15-21, 2004, at 19.
243. Id.at 21.
244. Id.at 20-2 1.
245. Id.at 21.
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Dallas, a firm that develops business plans for arenas and stadiums. 24 6
In 1998, two years before the arena opened, Nationwide Realty
Investors created a master plan to use its own property and acquire
other land to build 1.5 million square feet of office and retail space.
The total $500 million Arena District plan included the $150 million
247
arena.
"Six years later, the 95-acre Arena District has produced solid results,"
said Brian Ellis, president and CEO of Nationwide Realty Investors.
"Development to date has amounted to $519 million, with 1.1 million
square feet completed or scheduled to be completed by the end of
' 24 8
2004. The occupancy rate is 85 percent.
The current Arena District projects are a $28 million, 165,000-squarefoot office building opening in November [2004] and two buildings
containing 98 condominiums scheduled to open [in spring of 2005,]
with a 1,000-vehicle garage under construction to support those
249
structures.
The Eye Center, an eye surgery building staffed by 30
ophthalmologists, opens in 2005. Nationwide Realty Investors may
add 200 more condos than the 350 originally planned for the Arena
25 0
District.
And there's more. City and county officials are discussing the
possibility of relocating the Class AAA Columbus Clippers to a new
ballpark within the Arena District. The minor league facility would
join two other entertainment attractions in the district that were not
part of the original master plan but now play key roles, the eightscreen Arena Grand Theater operated by AMC and PromoWest
25 1
Pavilion, a 4,000-seat indoor/outdoor concert venue.

246. Id.at 20.
247. Id.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ARENA DISTRICT

District Size:
Location:

Land Uses

252

75 acres
Downtown Columbus, Ohio. Bounded by North High
Street to the east, Neil Avenue to the west, Spring
Street to the south and railroad tracks to the north
Nationwise Arena: 685,000 square feet
Commercial Space: 1.5 million square footage of
office, retail and entertainment
Residential Units Approximately 500 units

Adjacent Areas

The District is within walking distance of other
downtown attractions:
-Columbus Convention Center - currently
expanding and ranked among "25 Most Active
Convention Centers in North America." It
accommodates 1.5 million visitors a year.
*The Short North - an arts and entertainment area
featuring galleries and shops.
-The North Market - an historic public market
with quality food vendors.
-Scioto River - flows through Columbus, and is
just south of the Arena District.
-Ohio's Center of Science and Industry (COSI) science, technology, history and more come alive
in this interactive, architecturally-unique
museum.

Master Plan

Myers Schmalenberger/MSI of Columbus in
collaboration with Sasaki and Associates of Boston,
Heinlein Schrock Steams and NBBJ.

252. The
Arena
District-Downtown
districtnews.html?page=facts.

Columbus,

at

http://www.arenadistrict.com/
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Nationwide Realty Investors with the Dispatch
Printing Company. Nationwide Realty Investors
(NRI) is the real estate development affiliate of
Nationwide, a Fortune 500 company and the leading
provider of diversified insurance and financial
services. NRI is active throughout the United States
with a diverse portfolio of office, retail, hotels and
luxury apartments.

Unique Features

Class A Office Buildings with varying architectural
designs that incorporate brick and glass. To date, eight
buildings have been completed, all include Class A
office space with first floor retail opportunities. A sixstory, 165,000 square footage of office building will
be completed November 2004, and a five-story
medical facility, The Eye Center, will be completed in
2005.
Entertainment venues include the Arena Grand
Theatre, an eight-screen theatre that features balcony
seating; the PromoWest Pavilion, an indoor/outdoor
performance hall, and the Nationwide Arena, home to
the Columbus Blue Jackets and the Columbus
Destroyers. The CoreComm Ice Haus is an attached
ice rink that host team practices and offers public
skating. In addition, Arena District Television or
ADTV, a giant outdoor video board, lights up the
district with music videos, film shorts, Arena District
information and advertising.
Restaurants in the Arena District: BD"s, Mongolian
Barbeque, Buca di Beppo Italian Restaurant, Gordon
Biersch Brewery Restaurant, Chipotle Mexican Grill,
Max & Erma"s, Starbucks, O"Shaughnessy"s Public
House, Ben & Jerry"s Scoop Shop, Red Star Tavern
and Ted"s Montana Grill. Two nightclubs, the Frog
Bear & Wild Boar Bar and Fat Eddie"s offer nightly
entertainment as well as food.
Residential projects include Arena Crossing on Front
Street, a 252-unit project slated to open summer 2004,
and the Arena District Condominiums, a 98-unit
project that is scheduled to open spring 2005.
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Green space including McFerson Commons, a threeacre park with the historic Union Station Arch, along
with outdoor plazas located at the east and west Arena
entrances, provide public gathering sites and space for
outdoor entertainment.
Nationwide Boulevard a tree-lined brick street acting
as a pedestrian-friendly, commercial spine through the
District.
Parking, both covered and surface, is abundant. There
are 15,000 spaces, within a 5- to 10-minute walk. The
Arena District also offers convenient street access and
5-minute access to all major freeway systems.

Steve Ellman, owner of the NHL Phoenix Coyotes, left downtown
Phoenix to christen a new facility in Glendale, Arizona. In December 2003,
the publicly owned Glendale Arena was opened as the new home of the
Phoenix Coyotes. The Glendale Arena will be one of the anchors of a 450acre planned use development known as Westgate City Center, located in
Glendale, Arizona, the western gateway to metropolitan Phoenix at the
intersection of Route 101 and Glendale Avenue. 253 Westgate City Center is a
six million square feet mixed-use development including retail, entertainment,
office, hotel, and residential use.254 The first phase of Westgate City Center
will encompass 450,000 square feet of office, retail, and entertainment space.
New tenants in the first phase of the project include Lowe's Cineplex, a Virgin
Megastore, a restaurant operated by the Mastro Group, a Taifoon restaurant,
Martini Ranch nightclub, and two more high-concept restaurants to be built by
255
Fox Restaurant concepts.
"I'm building a city with 6.5 million square feet," said Steve Ellman, coowner of the NHL's Phoenix Coyotes. "It's a 10-year project. It's basically
planned as a real estate development with an arena stuck in the middle. We
went out in the middle of where Phoenix is growing and we're building a
destination totally different from an in-fill. There is nothing across the street.
256
We divided the property to create 'across the street."'

Glendale Mayor Elaine Scruggs has said that the first 1.6 million square

253. PipeDream or Pay Dirt?,supra note 242, at 22.
254. Id.
255. The Ellman Companies, Westgate Retail Project,at http://www.ellmanco.com/projects.php
(last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
256. PipeDream or Pay Dirt?,supra note 242, at 23.
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feet of mixed-use development will generate enough tax dollars to pay off the
city's bond debt and produce a minimum of $100 million in additional revenue
over a thirty-year period.2 57

What follows, according to Street & Smith's SportsBusiness Journal, is a
258
list of current sports venues tied into real estate projects:
Location-Name
Big Beaver, PA
Pittsburgh-area
horse racing
track
Charlotte, NCA
Bobcats Arena

Primary
Tenant
Thoroughbred
Racing

Estimated
Project Cost
$500 million

Other Development

NBA Charlotte
Bobcats

$265
million*

Retail, restaurants,
light rail

Upscale
townhouses, retail,
casino

257. City of Glendale, AZ, Approved Master Plan-NHL Coyotes Project,
http://www.ci.glendale.az.us/Coyotes/Approved-Master-Plan.cfrn (last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
258. Pipe Dream or Pay Dirt?, supra note 242, at 23.

at
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Corpus Christi,
TX
Corpus Christi
Arena
Whataburger
Field

Cudahy, WI
Powerade Iceport

$87
(combined)

$72 million

Convention center
expansion, streetcar
line

Hotel, bank,
Walgreen's,
Applebee's
Neighborhood Bar
& Grill
Housing,
government offices,
retail

Frisco, TX
Frisco Stadium

MLS Bum

$65 million*

Glendale, AZ
Cardinals
Multipurpose
Facility
Greensboro, NC
Greensboro
Stadium

NFL Arizona
Cardinals

$365
million*

Hotel, retail,
restaurants

Class A
Greensboro Bats

$61 million

Houston, TX
Houston Super
Speedway
Manchester, NH
Manchester
Stadium
Memphis, TN
FedEx Forum

Motorsports

$300 million

Transportation
center, theater,
housing, museum,
park
Conference center,
hotel, golf course

Class AA
Manchester
Fisher Cats
NBA Memphis
Grizzlies,
University of
Memphis men's
basketball
Class AAA
Nashville Sounds

$60 million $155 million

Nashville, TN
First Tennessee
Field
San Diego, CA
Petco Park
I

CHL, Corpus
Christi Rayz,
Texas A&MCorpus Christi
men's and
women's
basketball
Class AA Round
Rock Express
relocating
North American
Hockey League
expansion team

MLB San Diego
Padres

$250
million*

$80 million

$1 billion
I_

Condominiums,
hotel, power plant,
retail and restaurants
Retail, restaurants,
public transportation

Housing, retail,
government and
private business
Housing, retail,
hotels, park,
restaurants
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Springfield, MO
Hammons Field
St. Louis, MO
Cardinals
Stadium
Yonkers, NY
Yonkers Stadium
Youngstown, PA
Youngstown
Arena
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Southwest
Missouri State
University
baseball
MLB St. Louis
Cardinals

$32 million
(Est. cost for
construction
only)
$646 million

Hotel, retail,
restaurants

Atlantic League
expansion team
TBD

$41 million

Retail, restaurants

$70 million

Convention center,
hotel, retail

Retail, restaurants

VI. "NEW ECONOMICS"

New sports facilities have engendered new economics - fewer seats, more
expensive seats, and a catering to corporate America. Has the unprecedented
boom in sports facilities changed the economic scope of games and how they
are watched? Will the masses only, in the future, be able to afford either free
TV or paid TV as their means of watching games? Whatever your opinion,
the general effect of new sports facilities has been an increase in ticket prices
from the ticket prices of the old facility.
One commentator has stated:
Sports stadiums have traditionally held a sacred place in American
culture. This has changed in the last quarter century. The new
stadiums are impersonal and lack many of the qualities that endeared
their ancestors to us. The old stadiums were the last bastions of true
democracy in America, places like Ebbets Field, where the future
CEO of IBM might have sat next to the future CEO of Chuck's
Plumbing. These were the first civic centers of America, providing
places for people to gather and enjoy community and sport. People
from a myriad of different backgrounds came together to celebrate and
play. And so was born the classic stadium. These early, almost
magical, places helped to define the new and now hallowed American
values of hard work, teamwork, loyalty, and eventually tradition. The
buildings had souls and effused colorful memories of heroes and glory
259
days gone by.
While their place in American culture is still ingrained, stadiums do

259. Alexander F. Grau, Where Have You Gone Joe DiMaggio and Where are the Stadiums You

Played in?, at http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/stia/students/graua.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2004).
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not retain the same significance they once did. They have instead
matured into hollow structure devoid of the soul that at one time so
perfectly characterized their predecessors. The present structures may
resemble their ancestors in outward appearance, but inside they
conjure up only the faintest recollections of the great American
stadiums. Stadiums have grown tremendously from their humble
beginnings, but they have now become over-grown, lifeless structures
that litter American cities from coast to coast. They are no longer the
meeting places of America. The CEO of IBM would never sit next to
the CEO of Apple, let alone some plumber. The synergy of the
stadium has been lost. The world of sports unites only along its own
caste system. The people in the nosebleed section only relate to each
other. There is no way for a fan in row 150, who earns $5.25 an hour,
to relate to an athlete, who makes $5.25 a year (in millions), or the
260
CEOs in their catered luxury boxes.
While lacking these basic qualities that make a stadium worthwhile,
the structures have endured.
And how!
They have become
monuments to affluence, offering every service and good imaginable.
People no longer come for the community or even the game. Who
wants to watch the game when there are so many other interesting
things to do? The focus of the mass gatherings has shifted from the
entertainment of the community to the entertainment of the
26 1
individual.
Andrew Zimbalist, Professor of Economics at Smith College has said:
Higher tickets prices in the 1990s, however, have had more to do with
the gentrification of stadiums than the increasing popularity of the
sports themselves. On average, new facilities built in the last decade
have been financed with approximately two-thirds of the money
coming from public coffers. The public money, in turn, generally
comes from sales taxes or lottery funds-revenue sources that
disproportionately burden lower-income groups.
Since the
incremental benefits from the new facilities go mostly to the high
income and corporate fans (not to mention to the team owner and the
players), it makes more sense to finance construction out of ticket
(user) taxes or PSLs than out of general sales levies. With monopoly
262
sports leagues, fans will pay one way or the other.

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Andrew Zimbalist, Economics 100: Higher Ticket PricesNot Caused By Payroll,STREET &
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Steve Kelley, columnist for the Seattle Times, recently commented on
ticket price hikes for Safeco Field:
The Mariners say they need the money to compete with upper-tier
teams like Atlanta, the Yankees and the Mets. Haven't we heard that
one before? Remember when they told us all they needed was a new
stadium with its lush luxury-suite income to complete for a pennant?
Now they are asking $32 for an infield terrace seat and $27 for a field
box seat. Now almost every seat is priced like a luxury suite.
Remember when baseball was a bargain? And you thought, with the
farewell of former CEO Ellis, this might be a kinder, gentler
organization. It will cost you $32 instead of $28 for a box seat to a
game with the Minnesota Twins next season. You have to pay $18
instead of $16 for an outfield reserved seat for that Kansas City
Royals' game you absolutely can't miss. The only seats that stay the
same are the $5 center-field bleachers. There are only 1,837 of them.
Welcome to Y2K, the Mariner way. The Mariners got their pleasure
palace; now they want your disposable income. What happens next
year? 'Give us your firstborn and we'll get you a closer.' The nerve of
2 63
these money-grubbing, soulless leeches.
The following chart, as provided by Price Waterhouse & Cooper, indicates
that teams moving to new facilities have realized a significant increase in
ticket prices:

SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., July 10-16, 2000, at 46.
263. Steve Kelley, Price Hike a MarinerBrushbackfor Fans, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999, at
Dl.
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IMPACT OF NEW FACILITY ON TICKET PRICES

IENFL

MMLB

0 NBA

* NHL

In the NBA, Atlanta, Denver, Indiana, L.A. Clippers, L.A. Lakers and
Toronto Raptors are playing in new facilities for the 1999-2000 season. What
follows is a chart that compares the average ticket cost for the 1998-1999
season (in the old facility) and the 1999-2000 average ticket cost in the new
26 5
facility:
Team

1999-2000
Average Ticket

1998-1999
Average Ticket

Tickets
% Change

L.A. LAKERS
L.A. CLIPPERS
INDIANA
ATLANTA
MIAMI

$81.89
$43.89
$48.39
$45.75
$46.57

$51.11
$31.75
$43.36
$36.79
$36.55

60.2%
38.2%
11.6%
24.4%
27.4%

TORONTO

$42.76

$26.17

63.4%

DENVER

$38.34

$30.53

25.6%

Similar increases have occurred in baseball. For example, Seattle, Detroit,
Houston and San Francisco opened in new facilities for the 2000 season.
What follows is a comparison of average ticket prices for the 1999 versus

264. Provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers.
265. Team Marketing Report, 1999-2000 National Basketball Association Fan Cost Index, at
http://tmr.nelix.com/resources.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
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2000 seasons because of those teams changing facilities: 266
TEAM
SEATTLE
DETROIT
HOUSTON
SAN
FRANCISCO

2000
Average Ticket
$23.43
$24.83
$20.01
$21.24

1999
Average Ticket
$19.01
$12.23
$13.30
$12.12

Tickets
% Change
23.3%
103.0%
50.4%
75.2%

I

The Milwaukee Brewers opened in Miller Park in April of 2001. What
follows is a comparison of prices of individual game tickets for 2000 at
County Stadium versus individual game tickets for 2001 at Miller Park. 267

266. Team Marketing Report, 2000 Major League Baseball Fan Cost Index,
http://tmr.nelix.com/resources.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
267. Information provided by the Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club.

at
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COUNTY STADIUM
TICKET PRICES - 2000

SECTION

INDIVIDUAL
GAME

MILLER PARK
TICKET PRICES - 2001
SECTION

Mezzanine Diamond Box

Field Diamond Box
Field Infield Box

Diamond Box

Field Outfield Box

Lower Box

Loge Diamond Box

INDIVIDUAL
GAME

Loge Infield Box
Lower Grandstand

Loge Outfield Box

Upper Box

Club Infield Box
Club Outfield Box

Upper Grandstand

Terrace Infield Box
Terrace Outfield Box
Terrace Reserved

General Admission
Bleacher

Field Bleachers
Loge Bleachers
Club Bleachers
Terrace Bleachers

The National Football League has seen a rise in average ticket price as
well, with the opening of new facilities in Green Bay and Philadelphia. At
Philadelphia's Lincoln Financial Field, average ticket prices for individual
games are at $55-70, up from $45-55 the year before the new stadium was
built. In Green Bay, where historic Lambeau Field has undergone significant
renovations, individual game tickets have increased from the $46-59 range to
$50-63.
Team Marketing Report each year publishes a Fan Cost Index. The Fan
Cost Index (FCI) is the cost of attendance for a family of four includes two
adult average price tickets; two child average price tickets; four small soft
drinks; two small beers, four hot dogs; two programs; parking; and two adultsize caps. What follows is a comparison of the FCI for 2002-2003 and the
year that the FCI was first published, i.e. 1991-1992.
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MLB League Average (2003)268
Avg. Ticket: $18.69 (+2.84%)
FCI: $148.66 (+3.29%)
When the MLB Fan Cost Index was first published in 1991, the
average ticket cost was $9.14. The FCI was $79.41
NBA League Average (2003-2004)269
Avg. Ticket: $44.68 (+1.6%)
FCI: $261.26 (+ 1.8%)
When the NBA FCI was first published in 1991-1992, the average
ticket cost was $22.52. The FCI was $141.91.
NFL League Average (2003)270
Avg. Ticket: $52.95 (+ 5.8%)
FCI: $317.01 (+ 7.5%)
When the NFL FCI was first published in 1991, the average ticket cost
was $25.21. The FCI was $151.33.
NHL League Average (2003-2004)271
Avg. Ticket: $43.57 (+1.6%)
FCI: $253.65 (+2.8%)
Is American sport becoming inaccessible to the most important element of
the game? Is the future of stadiums a staged audience because middle class
Americans can't afford access to the game? Is the fan experiencing wallet
hemorrhaging? Are major sports simply a game of the rich? With the march
268. Team

Marketing

Report,

2003

Major League Baseball Fan

Cost

Index,

at

http://tmr.nelix.com/resources.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
269. Team Marketing Report, 2003-2004 National Basketball Association Fan Cost Index, at

http://tmr.nelix.com/resources.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
270. Team

Marketing

Report,

2003

National Football League Fan Cost Index, at

http://tmr.nelix.com/resources.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
271. Team Marketing Report, 2003-2004 National Hockey League Fan Cost Index, at

http://tmr.nelix.com/resources.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
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to build new and better facilities, suddenly those best seats for the average fan
have become club seats, luxury boxes, and personal seat licenses. Yes, new
sports facilities have engendered new economics - fewer seats, more expensive
seats, and a catering to corporate America. In addition, new facilities have
created increased ticket prices for the consumer, approximately a 60% iilcrease
in the NFL, a 30% increase in major league baseball, and a 20% increase in
the NBA.
Moreover, where is the fan represented in all of this?
Unfortunately, while there are representatives from union and management at
the bargaining table, nobody represents the typical bleacher bum. Will future
fans only be able to afford either free TV or pay TV as their means of
watching games? In addition, will fans become the victims, not just of
corporate greed, but also of their own bankrupt values? That its players,
managers and agents are paid more than teachers, nurses and poets because the
public - and that's you and me - puts it's wallet where its values are. On the
other hand, is the American sport product still the best entertainment value for
its dollar regardless of the cost?

